


RS-EER-89-029  
MARCH 1989



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

JPRS-EER-89-029

## CONTENTS

21 MARCH 1989

### POLITICAL

#### BULGARIA

- Swiss Paper Details Repressive Acts [*JOURNAL DE GENEVE 25 Jan*] ..... 1

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- CIA War Against Cuba Alleged ..... 2  
Secrets of the Saturn Cave [*TRIBUNA 16, 23, 30 Nov*] ..... 2  
Havana Visitor at Marriott [*TRIBUNA 23 Nov*] ..... 4  
Plan to Kill Fidel Castro [*TRIBUNA 30 Nov*] ..... 6  
Refusal of Young To Train as Workers Analyzed [*SMENA 5 Jan*] ..... 8  
Reader Deplores Failure to Educate Children [*RUDE PRAVO 24 Dec*] ..... 10

#### POLAND

- Article Presses for Katyn Massacre Revelations [*POLITYKA 18 Feb*] ..... 10  
October 1988 Media Developments, Changes [*PRASA POLSKA Dec*] ..... 17  
Party Activities Calendar 5-18 December 1988 [*ZYCIE PARTII 28 Dec*] ..... 19

#### YUGOSLAVIA

- Political Career of Morin: Reviewed [*DANAS 31 Jan*] ..... 21

### ECONOMIC

#### INTRABLOC

- Bloc Exploration of Oceanic Resources Detailed [*Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC 20 Nov*] ..... 24

#### HUNGARY

- Publication of Economic Indicators Urged [*FIGYELO 19 Jan*] ..... 25  
Independence of Intra-Enterprise Ventures Suggested [*FIGYELO 19 Jan 89*] ..... 28

#### POLAND

- New Rules Mark 'Radical Reform' for Banking ..... 29  
Interest, Credit Issues [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 2 Jan*] ..... 29  
New Banks 'Break' Monopoly [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 6 Jan*] ..... 30

#### YUGOSLAVIA

- Federation Budget for 1989 Analyzed [*EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 19 Dec*] ..... 30

JPRS-EER-89-029

## BULGARIA

## Swiss Paper Details Repressive Acts

29000019 Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French  
25 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by special envoy Alain Chevalerias: "Bulgaria at End of 1980's (II): Visit to Four Silenced Opponents"]

[Text] The man walked along haltingly, the gait of an old man over 80. When he was told that I was a reporter, his emaciated face brightened. Delighted, he practically pushed me from the garden to the house. The humidity chilled my bones. None of the radiators was working. The man sat me down on an iron bed, the only piece of furniture except for a white wooden table. (See our 24 January issue.)

His name was Iliya Minev. In labored French, he told me his life story: a long struggle against the system, nearly 30 years of camp and prison. Today, he receives no pension. To live, he has to make do with the meager income of his wife—90 leva a month (about \$40). She looks after him like a mother, worrying over his slightest coughing fit.

A few days ago, while she was being treated in the hospital, the militia announced to her the death of her husband. Iliya Minev's friends received the same news. He laughed: "I was the only one who did not get the news."

Still not recovered from her shock, she held back her tears. In a more serious tone, he added: "It is important for you in the West to know what Communism is all about."

Todor Zhivkov's regime pretends to ignore the existence of this old rebel. However, the militia are often watching the door of his home to intercept any visits. But on this morning on the first of the year, the police are not there, probably because they are too tired from the festivities of the night before.

## A Futile Attempt

Iliya Minev belongs to the Independent Human Rights Association, of which he is president. He stresses the word "independent," since the government established an organization of the same name, in a futile attempt to give the regime an appearance of liberalism. The association founded by Iliya Minev's friends is a group of long-time opponents, all victims of political or religious segregation. Some of them have been fighting for dozens of years. They were not invited to attend the luncheon last week given by President Mitterrand, who limited the meeting to the "moderate" opposition.

Several days earlier, at about 100 km from the coast of the North Sea in the north of the country, I had met with a family of Muslims. Zayne Ibrakhimova and her brother, Yusuf Ibrakhimov, recounted the following to me:

"On 28 May 1973 [as published], during a campaign of forced assimilation of Turkish-speaking people, the government moved us to a region over 400 km from our native village. All the men were detained. Our father received 2 years of internment because of his opposition to this policy. According to our estimates, 150 to 200 Bulgarian Muslims were executed at that time."

Today under house arrest, Zayne and Yusuf have also joined the ranks of the Independent Association. They are living in a tiny, uncomfortable house. The toilet facilities are nothing more than a hole dug in the ground at the back of the yard. Here, the large, gloomy blocks of flats that surround Bulgarian towns appear as an unimaginable luxury.

Pope Tupusliev is more fortunate, he lives in Plodiv, the second largest city in the country. Arrested in 1971, he was sentenced to 5 years' internment, during which time he was tortured by his guards.

"When I joined the Independent Association," he said, "my metropolitan (an officer in the orthodox religion) called me and tried to make me resign from the Association. He threatened to prohibit me from practicing my ministry."

With a thick beard and a vivacious manner despite his problems, Petur Manolov lives in poverty in the former Turkish district of Plovdiv. He has made freedom his religion:

"In 1968, after I took my position against the Soviet troop intervention in Czechoslovakia, I lost my job at the Bulgarian press agency. To raise our son, we had to survive without means in a home in the country. I have always tried to remain loyal to my ideas, even when that has meant that I could not eat every day."

## Arrests

Several days after I returned from Bulgaria, three western radio stations—the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Radio Free Europe—broadcast the interviews of Iliya Minev, Yusuf Ibrakhimov and his sister, Pope Tupusliev, and Petur Manolov. During a meeting of the Independent Human Rights Association at the home of Petur Manolov, the militia arrested them along with two or three other persons. On 12 January, the Bulgarian television announced that they were being held for "spreading false reports."

In the city of Ruse on the banks of the Danube along the Rumanian border, another organization is watching. It has complained about the contamination of the water

and environment by the factories of that city. On 29 December, the police arrested Rumen Tsankov, the secretary of the movement. On 5 January, the regime sent Stefan Cholakov to the State Security's interrogation center. He also belongs to the Independent Human Rights Association.

But the conflict has taken an even more troubling turn for the regime. On 3 November of last year, "the Club" was formed, a movement of intellectuals including, among other, a number of Communists who had up to then been close to the authorities.

Zhelyn Zhelev, a professor and member of the Cultural Institute, is president of the Club. With grey hair, a smiling face, and the calm assurance of people who are confident of their rights, he stated: "We want to work towards implementing glasnost and restructuring in Bulgaria. We are not trying to overturn the regime. But against all reason, and in spite of what is happening in the USSR, the government authorities have refused to have a dialogue."

To keep Zhelyn Zhelev and his friends quiet, the police have cut their telephone lines and interrogated them in their offices. The authorities have even tried to remove the Communists from the Party. But, a sign of the times, the decisions made by the Politburo are being contested by the district committees.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### CIA War Against Cuba Alleged

#### Secrets of the Saturn Cave

24000068 Prague TRIBUNA in Czech 16 Nov 88 p 16

[Article by Radovan Skalník: "The Secrets of Saturn Cave"]

[Text] About one hundred and twenty kilometers from Havana, on the highway connecting the villages of Mantazas and Varadero, is a place known as the Cueva de Saturno, Saturn Cave. Not far from there is a world-famous beach, frequented by many tourists. Nevertheless, Saturn Cave is a quiet place. This fact—and perhaps the romantic name of the place—so appealed to agents of the American espionage service, the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], operating in Cuba, that they chose it as one of the spots for passing on secret messages and packages.

A while back, Cuban television presented an 11-part series on the unlawful activities of officials in the American mission in Havana. Among other things, one could see well in the images captured by a hidden videocamera how a member of this mission, CIA agent Duane Thomas Evans, hid a transmitter on an 18-km-long highway leading to the Vinales tourist center in the Pinar del Rio province, about 170 kilometers west of Havana. His wife and daughter accompanied him. It would

appear that this was a family going on a trip to the Cuban mountains. This family evoked the very same picture by Saturn Cave, where they hid a transmitter and money at a previously agreed-upon place for a certain agent operating in Cuba.

### The Residence on Malecon Boulevard

The television serial, which aroused the attention of the entire world and exposed the activities of agents of the American in Cuba, was preceded by a diplomatic move by the Cuban government. It was at the beginning of July 1987, in the days when the tropical heat was at its peak in Havana and the streets of the city were half empty during the day.

In these days activity had quieted down even on Havana's Malecon Boulevard, where the seat of the American mission is located. For years Cuba and the United States have not maintained normal diplomatic relations, which the USA unilaterally severed after the fall of the pro-American Batista dictatorship and the victory of the Cuban revolution at the beginning of 1959. Currently, American interests in Cuba are represented by an official division of the Swiss embassy in Havana. Cuba and the United States have agreed to form missions, which are independent diplomatic institutions.

The American mission occupies a spacious 7-story building on Havana's waterfront, in which several tens of diplomatic and other employees work. In the days when the series was being broadcast, 13 diplomats operated in the mission. Four of them were exposed as CIA agents and their names, along with those of an additional 79 CIA workers, appeared on television and in the press. Since 1977, when this United States mission in Havana began operations, the so-called CIA local station has been installed in the second-top floor of the building on Malecon Boulevard. Among the diplomats who have in the last 10 years alternatively served there, 89 of them have been CIA employees or collaborators.

On July 6 last year, the interim chief of mission in Havana John M. Joyce was preparing for a wedding at the Spanish embassy. At five in the afternoon, shortly before he had anticipated leaving the mission, he was summoned to the Havana foreign ministry. The Deputy Minister R. Alarcon presented him with a wide-ranging note. During the reading of the note, Mr. Joyce was unable to conceal his embarrassment. The Cuban government informed him through the diplomatic channel that it had for a long time then been exhorting the American government to put a stop to the espionage activity of American diplomats on the island. Since Washington had not heeded these notices and continued to let spies with diplomatic passes operate in Cuba, the government announced that, three and a half hours after this meeting, there would follow a public expose of the subversive activities of officials of the American mission located on Malecon Boulevard.

At 8:30, when the heat had long since eased and it was now cool in the Havana streets, the television broadcast began. There were images of members of the American mission and their assistants, captured by Cuban security workers. The series on the activity of the American espionage services in Cuba had begun.

In the opening segment one could see a Lada bearing the identification markings of the Swiss representation (which the vehicles of the American mission also bear); how slowly it moved in the tall grass enclosing a garbage heap not far from Havana. It seemed that the driver and his passenger were looking for something. Cautiously they looked about, the passenger constantly turning to the rear. Suddenly the Lada stopped and both men came out. One of them carefully set forth on the mound of garbage where he removed a tattered plastic bag from the filth. Both men put some kind of article which they had removed from the back seat into the bag. Afterwards they returned the bag to its place.

The whole act took several minutes. The television introduced the Cuban audience to two employees of the American foreign ministry. The first of these was Richard M. Davidson, who has the diplomatic rank of Deputy Secretary for Political and Economic Affairs for the United States mission in Havana. Joseph Jaccarino, who hunted for the plastic bag in the garbage heap, is a worker in the communications service and came to Cuba for a short-term working visit. The television program also showed the viewers the article which ended up on the heap. It was an instrument of the RS-804 type, one of the most modern electronic devices used by the CIA. With its help, one can encipher and deposit into its electronic memory up to 1596 characters and transmit it in 20 seconds via the FLTSATCOM intelligence satellite to the center of the American espionage service, the CIA, in Langley. The small device, which can be placed in the double-bottom of a briefcase, costs 250 thousand American dollars.

#### **An Ostrich with its Head in the Sand**

Information from this espionage device did not reach the CIA center in the last months before this Cuban television expose. Reports from spies in Cuba did not arrive even in May of last year on the day when William Webster, who had replaced the long-term CIA chief W. Casey (who had died of a stroke), was led to the chief's office in Langley. When W. Webster assumed his place in Langley, the president of the United States proclaimed that "it is an honor and also a pleasure to announce to the people of North America, that they have the best and most efficient intelligence service in the world." A service which he said was composed of "honest people, who always act honorably and in accordance with the laws and moral values of their country." That was only 6 weeks before the playing of the Cuban television series on the operations of spies with diplomatic passes.

"The Cuban television series shed light on another side of the secret operations of the intelligence services of the United States," the Spanish paper *Cambio 16* said later. "It is shameful to see how American diplomats, or more correctly, spies impersonating diplomats, lurk in the garbage, hide like little children in the grass, or act like an ostrich, sticking its head in the sand before the whole world. The actions of the Americans in the special services in Cuba reek of conceit and provocation. It is all absolutely incompatible with the laws governing diplomatic workers. Such activity by diplomats of a foreign country is an affront to the international agreements on the establishment of the diplomatic corps and international law and is a textbook example of how it is possible to complicate and disrupt relations between two states."

Cuban television presented in the series many incidents, which cast doubt on or refuted the testimony of the president of the USA that the United States has the "most efficient" intelligence service in the world, as well as his opinion of the moral and professional qualities of its officials. Americans appeared on the Cuban channel 6 who were in situations which had much to do with the refined realm of the diplomatic world and much to do with the conceptions of successful agents of the intelligence services of the USA.

For example one could see the apparently innocent walk by an employee of the American mission Clyde M. Benford and his wife Katherina in places about 40 kilometers east of Havana. The couple looked around as they slowly walked along a short hill. The woman suddenly started to climb the steep side of the hill to get a package, which in sight of the hidden camera she hid in a satchel. After which both Americans very quickly, very nearly at a trot, returned to the car. The entire while Mr. Benford had a strong Cuban cigar in his mouth, which he did not take out, even when he sat down in his car, with identification number 57 and Swiss embassy markings. From the events, it was obvious that it was an American mission car. This car was also filmed in Havana's V.I. Lenin Park. In this case, only Clyde M. Benford was involved; he left a message there for his collaborator.

#### **Like an Elephant in the Porcelain Shop**

The video record made by Cuban security workers also showed the American Vice-Consul of the United States Havana mission, John L. LeBeau in an absolutely indiscrete situation as he nervously crawled through the high grass in a ditch along the highway, becoming thoroughly drenched in sweat, until he found the sought after article. It was a broken transmitter, "returned" there by one of the CIA agents, who is still operating in Cuba. Apparently, it is such a valuable piece of equipment, that the vice-consul himself would risk crawling in the ditch beside a busy highway.

Other members of the Havana mission and CIA employees were caught in similar acts, far removed from the diplomatic calling. Richard Brennan and his wife Virginia

were caught in the night on the outskirts of Havana, hiding a message for their agent in a secret box. This successful and active "diplomatic" couple appeared several more times in the television series, transferring messages or collecting intelligence information. The spouses worked not quite 2 years in Cuba and were recalled to the United States. Apparently because in their espionage activity they moved as an elephant in a porcelain shop.

The Cuban television series showed tens of American diplomats and their family members in sensitive situations. It was demonstrated that CIA workers, from 1983 to 1986, operating permanently or temporarily out of the United States Havana mission, hid four DST-501 transmitters and other technical devices. The television series practically became a technical demonstration and exhibition on the equipping of American spies in Cuba. In addition to transmitters and equipment for communicating via satellite with the CIA center in Langley, it did not omit "inventions" such as the computer which sends enciphered messages from Langley to agents by means of a satellite. There was also a lighter concealing a camera, which already belongs to classical spy equipment. Or the oil filter hiding a CJD-403 amplifier for rapid reporting to agents from the center.

Technical equipment is not an inexpensive matter. For example the price of a transmitter is estimated at more than \$100,000 a unit. The use of these transmitters and other CIA short-wave communication equipment grossly violates international telecommunication statutes.

#### Havana Visitor at Marriott

24000068 Prague TRIBUNA in Czech 23 Nov 88 p 16

[Article by Radovan Skalník: "A Visitor from Havana at the Marriott Hotel"]

[Text] The doorman in a sombrero obligingly opened the door to Panama's Marriott Hotel and bowed deeply to the entering visitor. He had just sailed into Panama from Havana a few hours before as a captain in the Cuban merchant marine *Navigacion Mambisa*. Already awaiting him in the luxury hotel were agents of the American intelligence service, the CIA.

The esteemed visitor was Antonio Garcia Urquiola, who came out in the Cuban television series on United States espionage activity against Cuba as a very important witness. He was acquired for collaboration with the CIA in 1978, when, on the way around the world, he landed in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

In a hotel there he was visited by three men, one of whom represented himself as a Mr. Normando. He said that he worked for the American diplomatic corps in the Netherlands. Later Mr. Normando was identified as a CIA agent with a diplomatic passport.

The three visitors' offer for the captain was absolutely direct and specific, because the CIA had been interested in Urquiola for a long while. In the time of his Amsterdam visit, the CIA center in Langley came to the conclusion that it could count on Urquiola as a collaborator because he had the requisite traits for espionage work.

#### The "Old Guard" in Action

Immediately upon the first meeting in Amsterdam Antonio Garcia Urquiola was offered a monthly pay of 350 dollars, which would be deposited on his behalf in certain North American banks at five percent interest. The captain was also given his covername, Alejandro.

Antonio Garcia Urquiola was in reality an employee of Cuban intelligence and under the cover name Aurelio was working to uncover CIA undercover activity against the Cuban merchant marine. CIA agents working in western ports, especially in the Netherlands and Spain, often strive to establish contacts with Cuban sailors and obtain their collaboration. These sailors then receive not only tasks of an espionage character, but also orders for sabotage acts directed at damaging the Cuban national economy.

In the comfortable apartment in the Panama Marriott Hotel Alejandro-Aurelio sat with an older, about 70-year-old, man, a high-level CIA officer, Roberto. It was not their first meeting, they had already seen each other earlier in various ports. A. G. Urquiola knew that Roberto, retired a while back, had been called, along with other tested officers, to further active duty in the CIA by President Reagan after his victory in the presidential election at the start of the 1980's. The task of this "old guard" was to reinforce espionage activity against Cuba.

"Roberto was really an experienced specialist. He was very efficient in everything," said A. G. Urquiola to Cuban television. "He always verified everything I did. He carefully monitored all my telephone conversations and had oversight over all with whom I came into contact in the ports. He always knew well even such trifles as whether the hotel in which I was staying had more entrances and what kind of buildings were in its immediate area. He spoke Spanish very well."

Alejandro-Aurelio was in frequent contact with Roberto. "Sometimes I called him at the head office in Virginia. At the telephone number he had given me for urgent needs, there was always a woman's voice. Just afterwards I was transferred directly to him."

During their last conversation, Roberto informed Alejandro-Aurelio that thenceforth he would be in contact with another CIA officer under the cover name of Juan. He is smaller in stature and knows Havana well. He further received the order to buy the fastest boat he could procure without regard to price.

That boat was to be equipped with espionage gear brought to Cuba by CIA agents. Later A.G. Urquiola received word to buy a boat "which meets the requirements set forth in the meeting." A precise amendment said: "With pesos which a new person will give you, secure the technical equipment."

On 28 February 1987, several months before the presentation of the television series on the activity of CIA agents in Cuba, CIA officer Duane Thomas Evans, who worked in Havana in the American mission, was caught in the act by a videocamera. In house 163 on Havana's Marianos street he was keeping technical espionage equipment which was to be installed on the boat which was to operate near Cuban shores and from which reports acquired by agents operating in Cuba were to be transferred. It was critical that it be a fast vessel which, if need be, could escape the boats of the Cuban coast guard. As long as necessary, the boat was to aim toward the shores of the United States. Under no circumstance was it permitted to fall into the hands of Cuban security workers.

The public could acquaint itself last year with the equipment of the boat and its assignment. It was thanks to Urquiola who in the Cuban television series spoke of how he became a CIA agent.

#### Alejandro-Aurelio's New Role

Since 1962 Antonio Garcia Urquiola worked as a stenograph for the Cuban merchant marine. Then he started to study at the air force academy and became a pilot. After completing an additional course he became the captain of a smaller freight ship.

Since 1966 he was assigned to train as a worker in Cuban state security. In later years CIA agents hung around him until they decided to approach him in 1985 in Amsterdam. It was motivated by the news that Urquiola had been dismissed from the ranks of the members of the Communist Party of Cuba for failure to fulfill work responsibilities and other offenses. It was a step agreed upon by Cuban security workers to make Urquiola an "approachable" person for the CIA. In connection with this there was also a change in his working arrangements; from a captain of the merchant marine, he became a captain-inspector.

He had to abandon the helm of the San Martin. In a meeting with CIA officer Roberto, who knew well his love of the sea, he was asked whether it was difficult for him to give up his ship. "Of course it was difficult," he answered. "But I had other reasons for the decision."

Roberto then congratulated him for how he was weathering life's tests. But at that time he could not know of what other reasons Urquiola spoke.

Alejandro-Aurelio quickly moved into a new role as a CIA agent. When one day in Havana harbor he met television cameraman Mark Tamay, whom he had

known from the ship and who addressed him as a captain, he answered that he was a captain, but without a ship. Of this and other incidents Urquiola in the series spoke with a smile. And he spoke also of his "entrance examination" into CIA service, which he had to take on a lie detector.

"That machine does not do anything except the normal psychological exploitation of a novice, which must lead one to the conclusion that he had become afraid," recalled the former CIA agent. "The technician and intelligence officer who were present for my test on the lie detector assured me that by this means many spies working against the CIA had been identified and that in this regard the machine was absolutely reliable. That it is not possible for it to make a mistake. Later they told me that the results of my examination were very good, but that I had to undergo an evaluation and analysis on a computer. But these are matters that are known. The actual investigation by lie detector is run so that they ask simple questions first and they must be answered simply yes or no. Your name is such and such? You were born at such and such a place? Your father was such and such a person? Are you a Communist? Do you work at sea? Do you work for Cuban security? If the graphic curve on the monitor does not move evenly, it means that you are lying."

In the nine months of his activity in the CIA Alejandro-Aurelio met with other CIA collaborators in various cities. He never met with CIA agents operating in the United States mission in Havana. The rule that Cuban agents never came into personal contact with CIA agents in Cuba was in effect. In collaboration with Cuban security workers Urquiola sent hundreds of bits of information to the CIA center in Langley, which he had written in invisible ink or sent by radio via satellite.

As a result of his work, with which they were very satisfied in Langley, he was awarded 120,000 dollars, which lie deposited in North American banks. In addition to which, he could use bank checks for personal expenses, on which he could draw funds at his own discretion. For fully nine months he informed them of the movement of Cuban merchant ships and the sorts of goods transported.

#### Award in the Anthony House Hotel

Cuban security workers have done well in the service of the CIA. None of them have been exposed. This attests that espionage reports prepared for the CIA by Cuban security services were so credible that they never aroused suspicion.

It was not possible to enlist an additional Cuban security worker, fishing boat captain Juan Luis Acosta Guzman, into the CIA. During a visit to the Canary Islands in

1974 he agreed to an offer to collaborate with the CIA. For years they never suspected in Langley that he was in reality a worker in Cuban counterintelligence working under the cover name Mateo. His assignment, as he told Cuban television, was to transmit reports on the movements of commercial and fishing ships, on shipments, on the situation in Cuban harbors, and also to convey messages and equipment for agents working in Cuba.

Also affirming the good work of Cuban security services is the fact that 3 years ago one of the Cuban agents who had penetrated the CIA was decorated in room 503 of the Anthony House hotel in Washington by the deputy director of the operations section in the CIA, who had represented himself as Edwards. The decorated member of Cuban security Eduardo Leal Estrada reflected on this:

"In 1985 I visited Washington to participate in an international conference on communications. During this conference I experienced one of the greatest surprises of my life. A CIA official—a certain Albert, who had made contact with me—informed me that CIA director William Case had awarded me a decoration for the high-quality information which I had provided on Cuban communications. In connection with this there was a financial award of \$10,000."

Eduardo Leal Estrada established contact with the CIA in 1980 by means of John Bruce, who had been accredited with the American mission in Havana. He worked under the cover name Jose Luis Tamayo. He was to transmit information on Cuban communications, principally on the installation of coaxial cable and on its characteristics, traffic, security, and its branches. The CIA central was further interested in cooperation by Cuba and the Soviet Union with Nicaragua in the realm of communications.

Another CIA agent, really a Cuban security worker, was Ignacio Rodriguez Mena, an employee of the commercial air service: "The CIA requested information pertaining to various aspects of the mood of the population, the medical situation among them, and even shipments of Cuban units to Angola and Ethiopia. I was last in contact with CIA workers in mid-1986 in Madrid. A certain CIA employee, under the name of Paco, informed me that there was already a quarter million dollars in my personal account."

### **Plan to Kill Fidel Castro**

24000068 Prague *TRIBUNA* in Czech 30 Nov 88 p 16

[Article by Radovan Skalník: "The Plan to Kill Fidel Castro"]

[Text] The most interesting fact of the Cuban television series on the war of the American intelligence service, CIA, against Cuba concerned the CIA's efforts to physically liquidate Fidel Castro. These efforts intensified in the early 1980's.

CIA agents, who were in actuality Cuban Security workers, were to find out everything connected with Fidel Castro's flights abroad, from the security measures undertaken at Havana Airport to the locations of stops enroute.

Items of great interest to the CIA even included the numerical strength of Castro's personal security staff, its armament and social makeup, and the usual position of Castro's vehicle in the motorcade. One of the putative Cuban CIA agents had the assignment of reporting which sporting establishments Fidel Castro visits, where he pursues sporting activities, and so forth.

Representatives of the Cuban revolution, the false CIA agents, some of whom had obvious affiliation with specific attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, spoke of the extreme attention the CIA gave to the Cuban revolution.

### **Preparation for the Act**

"For every Cuban revolutionary it is really disturbing to learn that the assassination of Fidel Castro is being prepared," said Antonio Garcia Urquiola. "At the end of my 9-month service in the CIA, I was entrusted with the most important of all tasks assigned me thus far. From the questions they were asking me, I concluded that the action concerned Fidel Castro.

"I was to find out the maximum information on the daily regime of Fidel Castro, his visits among workers, his daily schedule, the number and reliability of people in his personal guard, and how they act in the company of a greater number of people. I came to suspect that an order to buy a fast boat, without regard to cost, about which the CIA agents had spoken before, that was to be used primarily for communications tasks, was in connection with the assassination being prepared."

At a press conference following the release of the television series newsmen could learn further details of how the CIA prepared to assassinate Fidel Castro. Some of the "uncovered CIA agents," otherwise Cuban Security employees, answered the question from the American television corporation NBC about the preparation for this assassination attempt.

Orlando Argudin: "On specific plans to assassinate Fidel Castro the people from the CIA obviously did not talk to us. From us they wanted only information, or particular jobs. During one meeting in Madrid for example they asked me to try to find an incurably ill person or a potential suicide who would be able to get near Fidel Castro."

Ignacio Rodriguez: "The American CIA had a great interest in what security measures are taken at Havana Airport when Fidel Castro comes or makes foreign visits. From me they wanted to find out in what areas he stays,

what routes and airplanes he uses on trips abroad or in Cuba. I was supposed to find out every detail connected with his movements on Havana Airport."

Eduardo Leal: "As an employee of the Ministry of Communications, my assignment principally was to provide the CIA with information on the means of communications used on official trips by our highest representatives, especially Fidel Castro. I was to report in as much detail as possible on the equipment used in these communications, on the so-called high-level lines, on all people who have access to this equipment, and so forth."

On the preparation for assassinating Fidel Castro actual CIA agents from the ranks of Cuban citizens, successfully exposed and tried, also spoke. Agent Antonio, a physician specializing in peritonitis and appendicitis (known to Cuban security organs as Enrique) related that he was supposed to deliver CIA agents stationed in the American mission in Havana regular reports on Fidel Castro's physical condition through coffins in the vicinity of the capital city. Other agents were to find out whether, in his visits to enterprises and institutions, Castro followed a precisely laid out program or whether he improvised, etc.

The CIA devoted considerable attention to one question, which would seem to have been raised prematurely. The CIA was interested in what reaction could be anticipated from the Cuban population in the event of an unsuccessful attempt on Fidel Castro. The answer to that question was sought by many CIA agents, who also were interested in tipping off groups dissatisfied for various reasons with social changes in Cuba (as for example former landowners and their descendents). According to the CIA scenario applied in other countries, after the assassination of the highest Cuban representative, these groups would attempt to arouse chaos and disorder, which would create the conditions for other varieties of coercive United States action against Cuba.

From the answers of the former CIA agents, including those who were really Cuban Security workers, it is clear that in the CIA center in Langley they were seriously engaged in preparing an attempt on Fidel Castro. This was also affirmed by several American newspapers; the New York Times, for example, citing an undisclosed source, wrote in 1985 that the CIA had already been working for several years preparing the assassination of the Cuban representative. According to the daily it is the most strictly secret of plans, through the realization of which Washington promises to strike a hard and insidious blow to the Cuban revolution.

#### According to the Old Scenario

Similar accounts of preparations within a special division of the CIA for an attempt on the head of a sovereign state are not exaggerated. In the 1980's several assassinations with very mysterious backgrounds have been carried out. In recent years more heads of state have died

violent deaths than in any previous period. They include, for example, the presidents of Ecuador and Mozambique Jaime Roldos and Samora Machel, Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos and the Prime Ministers of Sweden and India Olof Palme and Indira Gandhi. In none of these cases can CIA involvement be ruled out.

Considerable suspicion of involvement by CIA agents was aroused by the circumstances of the assassination, which is what the world press considered the crash of the airplane which the popular leader of the Panamanian revolution General Omar Torrijos was on board. His plane crashed in late June 1981 in a thus far unidentified area in the mountains of northern Panama. In the late 1970's the USA had agreed to gradually turn over to Panamanian control by the end of the century the canal zone, which had then been under American control for decades. This agreement was a great victory for General Torrijos's government, which consistently asserted the national interests of the Panamanian people.

In 1980 the so-called Santa Fe Document, worked out by a group of the most reactionary North American politicians, was published. It became the basic program of White House policy toward Latin America. It openly spoke of the need to deal with the "extreme left-wing dictatorship of Omar Torrijos."

Various surmises as to the causes of the plane crash which took the life of the defender of Panamanian sovereignty held sway. Some newspapers carried reports that the United States has the capability, with the aid of satellites and other technical devices, to follow the movements of all aircraft in all of Central America. This applies above all to the Panama Canal Zone where the USA has several important military bases. It would have been no problem for the CIA to find out that Torrijos regularly flew to northern Panama, where his plane went down.

Several weeks before the tragic death of General Torrijos, on 24 May 1981, another unsatisfactorily explained mishap took place. About 700 km south of Ecuador's capital city, Quito, then-President Jaime Roldos and his defense minister crashed in a new and thoroughly inspected airplane.

Even this case had broader circumstances. The government of President Reagan, after coming to power in the early 1980's, in no way concealed its indignation with Roldos's foreign policy, which was demonstrated in, among other things, support for Sandinist Nicaragua and sympathy with the struggle of the Salvadoran people.

Several months after this air catastrophe, the world press carried the news that an aircraft of the American Air Force had gone down in California. On board was the most modern equipment used to divert aircraft from their original courses.

Reminiscent of this report was an event which occurred several years later which took the life of Mozambiquean President Samora Machel. On 19 September 1986, his plane went down when it struck a high hill about 700 meters from the border of the racist South African Republic.

Only several days before the South African racists had threatened Mozambique with new reprisals and hinted that they could be directed toward the person of Samora Machel. The South African racists had had their eyes on the Mozambiquean president for a long while. By the end of 1985, a Pretoria-inspired plot, the aim of which was to arouse unrest in Mozambique, had been exposed. Its first stage was to be an attempt on Samora Machel.

The aircraft carrying the Mozambiquean leader was in perfect working order, the weather conditions during the flight were good, and cloud cover was at an elevation of about 1,000 meters. The TU-134 was piloted by an experienced Soviet crew, which had been working in Mozambique for about 2 and 1/2 years and had carried out 65 landings in Maputu alone, mostly at night.

#### Poisoned Cigars

An investigation by a tripartite commission (Mozambique, USSR, South African Republic) and a supplementary inquiry by Soviet authorities, came to the conclusion that the air tragedy in which 34 persons lost their lives, was a pre-planned act. The plan was led off course by a false signal of an instrument which the Americans had already been testing on the base in California in the early 1980's. All bear witness to the fact that one of the variations of attempts on Fidel Castro was to be carried out through the use of the same technical devices for changing the course of an airplane. It was no coincidence that CIA agents so intensively inquired into everything connected with Fidel Castro's flights abroad and in Cuba.

Fidel Castro has for many years been the center of an uncommon interest by American intelligence services, and against him they have intended to use the whole range of assassination methods; everything from gunfire to poisoned drugs, to ball-point pens saturated with poison.

After the victory of the Cuban revolution in 1960, the CIA worked out a secret plan according to which Fidel Castro was to be killed by a strong poison—botulin, with which one of his favorite cigars was to be saturated. Merely touching the poisoned cigar to one's lips would lead to instant death. In 1963 for Castro's assassination exotic-looking fish which concealed powerful charges were placed in places where he went swimming. He was sent as a gift a swimming suit soaked in a chemical which causes a chronic skin disorder. In 1972, yet another

attempt was to be carried out against him during an official trip to Chile, where the government of Salvador Allende was in power. The weapon was to be built into a false camera.

All plans to assassinate Fidel Castro failed.

#### Refusal of Young To Train as Workers Analyzed 24000071 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 5 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Jan Danek, Doctor of Pedagogy, candidate for doctor of science (CSc.), Slovak Academy of Sciences Institute of Experimental Pedagogy: "Why Young People Do Not Want To Be Workers"]

[Text] Approximately 60 percent of all young men and women of high school age train for work that they will perform for the rest of their lives at secondary professional training centers. Because this is the largest group of high school age students, but mainly because this future working class generation will have in its hands the keys to our development into the next century, we expect a lot from them. We expect that in addition to their skills and their attitudes they will also offer their heart to their homeland. We expect that they will produce whatever they produce to the best of their ability.

Will this generation be able to meet these expectations? Will it know how to do these things? Will it want to? We are asking these and other vital question related to apprenticed young people more and more these days. The view of a researcher is one point of view on a problem. We consider it to be an introductory contribution to the search for the truth about secondary professional training centers and their students. We would be glad to hear from all of you, esteemed readers. We are interested in your views, your comments, your experiences. We are also open to ideas of what should be either added or taken away from the educational program for working class young people. We will use your letters in a roundtable discussion to which we plan to invite employees of the SSR Ministry of Schools, Youth, and Physical Education, teachers from secondary professional training centers, education consultants and experts from research institutes dealing with the young, working class generation. Send your letters to: SMENA Editorial Offices, Martanovicova Street, No. 25, 812 14 Bratislava. Write on the envelope: Vocational Youth.

In a socialist society the working class is the sole governing class. As such it has a significant impact on social, political, and economic life. Currently a significant conflict is developing in this dynamic and not always problem free process. In particular, problems are arising more and more frequently with attitudes to working class professions. Interest is declining. Individuals are less and less interested in becoming a member of the ruling class.

What is the core of this problem?

We must search for the answer to this problem in its social, economic, political, and pedagogical context.

Currently the historical role of the working class is receiving greater emphasis than ever before. Its work ethic and intolerance towards shortcomings, lackadaisical attitudes, protectionism, sloppiness, and other nonsocialist phenomena is being held up as an example. These are the characteristics of the working class that have made it the revolutionary, progressive, true custodian of social property. Gradually however, the working class is losing interest in its own mission. There are two reasons: an inadequate response to existing problems, and a lack of respect for the views of creative and initiative-taking workers in seeking solutions to the many shortcomings in the production process and everyday life. An administrative and directive based approach to problem solving in production and to the overall management of the national economy has gradually shifted workers away from direct participation in the management and allocation of what is produced. The working class has assumed a theoretical position in a society where it is supposed to be the ruling class! At the same time those employed in the blue collar professions have not lost their interest in work. They only need to have the work environment well organized, have available the raw materials, components and equipment necessary to do their jobs, and to make full use of their qualifications.

Another reason for the declining attractiveness of blue collar professions is the overestimation of the importance of equipment and new technologies, which have not been integrated into the production process as flexibly as they should have been. In addition, working on obsolete machinery while being asked to improve both the quality and the volume of production has left workers with no opportunity to develop true creativity or to take initiative. They have been viewing, and continue to view initiative as the work necessary to fulfill plan tasks that their managers have been unable to meet by organizing work well and making use of the work day. Manipulating people under these circumstances does nothing to increase either their activity level or their class consciousness.

A third reason is the fact that we have become accustomed over the years to blame economic problems mainly on the people directly involved in production. This means the workers on the plant floor and at united agricultural cooperatives [JZD]. Calls for work initiatives, improvements in work quality and on the job attitudes were addressed mainly to them. It has been as though other workers—those in offices, service workers, all workers of the institutional superstructure—have played no role in the positive and negative aspects of economic life. Administrative-directive management has made it possible, and still makes it possible to live well at the expense of the greater society. It is responsible for bribery, the use of contacts to get things done, the abuse of positions, and the like. Under these conditions the worker has truly ceased to be a factor of production

who makes things with his own labor. All of these problems naturally penetrate the consciousness of young people, and we do not often do a good job of countering the impressions by explaining the reasons for many problems and pointing out feasible solutions. The lack of interest among young people in joining the working class is just the logical outcome of these failings.

Elementary school also does not help the reputation of the working class. For instance, only those students with poorer academic performance are recommended for the blue collar professions. This type of selection process is harmful to society and to every young person. A student should be free to choose his or her own profession. It should be a process of self analysis and reflection, with the active participation of teachers, parents and in some cases a worker from a production organization who has taken an interest in helping young people make career decisions.

Another serious problem is that not every blue collar profession is in the forefront of the interests of 14 year old boys and girls. This is true even when the skills required are close to the skills required in a profession for which there is an interest. Take for example the professions of automobile mechanic, equipment installer, and equipment repairman. There is great interest in the first profession, and a low level of interest in the last two. Why? One critical element is the potential for extra income. This exists for the profession of automobile mechanic. For this reason, at a national level the problem of a fully objective evaluation of honest work remains an open question in terms of the attitude of the young generation to working class professions.

Another problem is the need to do away with phenomena such as the forcing of weaker students into selected fields at the expense of better, more talented and assertive fellow students. Everyone who practices this sort of favoritism should take some time to think about the emotional wounds it inflicts on the young person.

In order to provide proper training for work and for selecting a profession we must eliminate all negative social phenomena and apply the principles of the communist work ethic on a foundation of the work ethic of the working class. Likewise it is necessary to take several concrete steps to correct perceptions of blue collar professions. These should include the following:

1. Develop detailed and effective job descriptions for the blue collar professions;
2. Develop more effective training techniques for students in work training and professional orientation programs, designed to develop work abilities, dexterity, habits, and improved knowledge of the requirements of the profession;
3. Close cooperation with families;

4. Coordination of institutional efforts to have programs reflect realities of production environments;
5. Active recognition of regional problems in production branches;
6. Integrating participant training programs into the process of professional orientation;
7. The objective evaluation of abilities, interests, and potential of all students in terms of the demands of different types of high schools;
8. Evaluate all types of secondary schools with the objective of clarifying how their educational curricula fulfill specific goals;
9. Provide direct experiences of the work process at factories, and their work organization.

#### **Reader Deplores Failure to Educate Children**

24000070 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech  
24 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Vaclav Zima: "Who's Fault is It?"]

[Text] On 2 November 1988 RUDE PRAVO printed for its readers the Report on Fulfillment of the CSSR Government Program Declaration, presented by Frantisek Pitra, chairman of the CSSR Government.

The Report emphasizes the importance of the family in raising the young generation. This is absolutely correct because many people, including party members, place the blame solely on the poor environment provided by our schools, and therefore, understandably the teachers. The report also recognizes that there are exceptions to this rule. Comrade Pitra states: "The raising and education of the younger generation is not solely the concern of the school system. Without the support of home upbringing neither the schools nor society will be able to achieve the desired results." In other words the ones who need "educating" are the parents and grandparents. When a mother hurries from work to a nursery or day care center for her children, then takes them with her shopping but cannot find what she wants in several stores, she is angry. The children bear the brunt of this from the start. If they do something while waiting in line, their mother at least spansks them. Then, when she can't find basic food items and has to hunt for them, frustration and anger grow in proportion to the lost time and energy, eventually reaching a point where the mother says some things that children shouldn't hear. The same is true of fathers who want to repair something at home because they know they won't receive prompt service from the apartment management enterprise [OPBH], and therefore aren't very selective about their language.

Children also hear about the problems that exist in our republic from their parent's conversations before dinner or at bedtime, when the parents are discussing the problems they are having at work, or something one of them overheard on the public transit system.

In the end the lack of certain items comes to be associated with socialism. "Yeah, they have it made in the West..." People who say this ignore the fundamental aspect of these problems, namely that management has failed and this has resulted in a breakdown of discipline and commitment. But let's get back to upbringing. When children are required to attend school, they tend to believe their parents more than their teachers. It is at home where they confirm whether something is true or not: whether or not the bread is like mud again, the rolls like rubber, whether or not the meat is mostly fat and gristle, whether or not the heat functions when it is cold, or whether the heat is turned on when it is warm outside. They hear at home that dad had to bribe someone to get a spare part that he needed... This is the way children gradually develop a sense of morality.

Now to go one step further. Because he or she loves their parents a child will do something helpful or nice: clean a pair of shoes, take out the trash, vacuum a room, wash the dishes. Instead of thanking the child (in some families the words "please" and "thank you" have magically vanished lately, and unfortunately this is the case at most workplaces as well), the parent gives the child some money. This also helps form the child's attitude to work, and to the parents: not even fools work for nothing.

Who then started this bribery, this self-interest, this double dealing? Where did this lack of discipline, this wastefulness, and the like suddenly come from? Some say that these are the "health problems" of socialism. This is fine, except socialism is also the family!

#### **POLAND**

#### **Article Presses for Katyn Massacre Revelations**

26000328 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish  
No 7, 18 Feb 89 p 14

[Article by Tadeusz Pioro: "In the Katyn Forest"]

[Text] "The years 1939-41 are a difficult and tragic chapter. They have left Polish graves on Soviet soil, both known and unknown. We know that the graves were not only Polish... Stalin's repressions against Poles, including Polish communists, intertwined with the great tragedy of the Soviet peoples, as well as that of the international workers' movement...

...Certainly, any crime, any human suffering has a moral dimension. They cannot be deleted, they should not be passed over in silence. Joint work by Polish and Soviet historians is under way. We believe it will allow us to gain a better understanding of the background, course and nature of various tragic events."

(An excerpt from a speech by Wojciech Jaruzelski in the Sejm on 11 July 1988)

"Now about the extermination of Polish officers in Katyn. Many people in Poland are convinced that this is the work of Stalin and Beriya. The history of this tragedy is now being studied meticulously."

(Mikhail Gorbachev in response to questions asked at a meeting with representatives of the Polish intelligentsia at the Royal Castle in Warsaw on 14 July 1988)

This happened in February 1944. The 1st Artillery Brigade of Gen Berling's corps, in which I was a battery commander was stationed in the vicinity of Smolensk after its formation at the Seltzy Camp. The front in this area was stationary, and the troops on both sides settled in, in well-fortified defensive positions.

At this very time Soviet authorities decided to organize a mourning ceremony in the Katyn forest, at the common grave of the Polish officers buried there, who, according to official declarations, were killed there by Germans in the fall of 1941. An extensive communique to this effect was published in the Soviet press on 26 January 1944. It was signed by an 8-person Special Commission headed by Academy Member Prof N. Burdenko.

I will quote an excerpt from the introduction to this communique:

"The Special Commission had at its disposal very extensive materials furnished by N. Burdenko, his associates and forensic experts who arrived in Smolensk on 26 September 1943, immediately after the liberation of this city... The Special Commission has established that graves in which prisoners of war—Poles shot by Hitlerite occupiers are buried are located on the Vitebsk Highway, in the vicinity of the Katyn Forest, 15 kilometers from Smolensk, at the locality called 'Kozi Gory,' at a distance of 200 meters from the highway, in the southwestern direction towards the Dnieper... Large numbers of corpses in Polish military uniforms were found in the graves. According to calculations by forensic experts, the total number of corpses amounts to 11,000." (quoted after ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, 4 March 1952).

We should note at this point that, beginning in March 1943, the Union of Polish Patriots headed by Wanda Wasilewska was operating in Moscow, and Polish military units were being formed in Seltzy. However, not one representative of Polish political or military circles was nominated to the Burdenko commission.

I arrived in Katyn on 1 February 1944 together with the former prisoner of Starobelsk, commander of the 1st Artillery Brigade Col Leon Bukojemski, as a member of a military delegation to the mourning ceremony (the delegation was headed by Gen Berling). I came to be

included in this group because it was known that my father, a career medical service colonel, had been in the Starobelsk camp and, presumably, had died at Katyn.

I did not question the content of the Soviet communique, and I simply knew nothing about publications which had previously appeared on the other side of the front. Besides, if I had known about them I would have undoubtedly considered them false.

Doubts came later.


"Kozie Gory," or more precisely Kosogory (Russian Kosogory) are foothills near Smolensk, between the Dnieper and the railway line from Smolensk to Minsk. In the vicinity of a railway spur line, there were two stations with loading ramps, Gnezdovo and Katyn, and on the other side of the Dnieper there was the small locality of Katyn.

Guided by NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] soldiers controlling traffic we got there from Smolensk on a wide dirt road. We got off. We came on foot to a small clearing where a freshly covered giant common grave was visible, with an eagle and the caption "Hail to the Fallen! 1941" laid out in cones on the snow covering it. In the center, there was a large wooden cross. The grave was raised at a distance of 700 to 800 meters from the Dnieper, on the bank of which, in the forest, there was a cottage belonging to the Smolensk Office of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, as was stated in the Soviet communique.

A mourning mass was said, and several speeches were made later. During the mass, I began to walk through the forest surrounding the grave. In places, there still were pieces of officer belts pressed into the moss under a layer of snow, rusty eagle badges, rotten remnants of caps with rusty jagged stains on the rear part of the rim (the prisoners were shot in the occiput) and some pieces of rope and wire. I thought about going to the nearest village and learning from its inhabitants more about the events in Kosogory. This, however, turned out to be impossible: there were NKVD posts at all exits from the forest, and only the road by which we came from Smolensk was open. Somewhat later, Col Bukojemski told me that when he was there earlier with Berling, he also wanted to talk to the locals. However, he found out that they were not there. Migrants from other places who did not know anything lived in their homes.

#### Prison Camps in the USSR

On 17 September 1940, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (central organ of the Soviet Army) reported that, since 17 September 1939, 181,000 Polish prisoners of war had been on Soviet territory, including about 10,000 career and reserve officers.



Map 1. Key [Captions and place names appearing on the map are transliterated or translated as applicable.]

Mapa rejonu Katyn-Gnezdowo—Map of the Katyn-Gnezdovo Area

Do Witebska—To Vitebsk

N. Batoki—N. Batoki

Sofijka—Sofiyka

Gnezdowo—Gnezdovo

Do Orszy—To Orsha

Dniepr—Dnieper

Droga—Road

Mile—Miles

Do Smolenska—To Smolensk

Kozie Gory—Kozyi Gory [Kosogory]

Gnezdowo stacja—Gnezdovo station

Katyn Stacja—Katyn station

Borok—Borok

Katyn—Katyn

Willa NKVD—NKVD cottage

Map 2. Key [Captions and place names appearing on the map are transliterated or translated as applicable.]

Kozielsk—Kozelsk

C. Jaszkw—Ostashkov

Archangelsk—Arkhangelsk

Finlandia—Finland

Kotlas—Kotlas

M. Bałtyckie—Baltic Sea

Estonia—Estonia

Lotwa—Latvia

Kowno—Kaunas

Polska—Poland

Lwow—Lvov, Lviv

Kijow—Kiev

Dniepr—Dnieper

Vologda—Vologda

Bologoje—Bologoye

Starobielsk—Starobelsk

M. Białe—White Sea

Dzwina—[North] Dvina

Helsinki—Helsinki

Leningrad—Leningrad

Tallin—Tallinn

Ryga—Riga

Litwa—Lithuania

Wilno—Wilno, Vilnius

Prypec—Pripjat

Ploskirow—Ploskirov

Rumunia—Romania

Dunaj—Danube

Griazowiec—Gryazovets

Jarosław—Yaroslavl

Wolga—Volga

Moskwa—Moscow

Witebsk—Vitebsk

Katyn—Katyn

Pawliszczew Bor—Pav-

lishchev Bor

Kaluga—Kaluga

Tambow—Tambov

Woronez—Voronezh

Charkow—Kharkov

Stalingrad—Stalingrad

Rostow—Rostov

Dniepropietrowsk—Dne-

propetrovsk

Jalta—Yalta

Gorki—Gorkiy

Wiazma—Vyazma

Smolensk—Smolensk

Minsk—Minsk

Juchnow—Yukhnov

Tula—Tula

Kursk—Kursk

Kazansk—Kazansk

Zlotonosze—Zoloto-

noshi

Don—Don

Stalino—Stalino

Odessa—Odessa

M. Czarne—Black Sea



Map 2. Key [Captions and place names appearing on the map are transliterated or translated as applicable.]

At the time, the existence of three officer camps was already known: in Starobelsk, on the Aydar river, 200 kilometers southeast of Kharkov; in Kozelsk, 250 kilometers southeast of Smolensk; and in Ostashkov, a historic town on the bank of the Selige lake, 300 kilometers northwest of Moscow. In the fall, letters to families in Polish territories began to arrive from these three camps. I received the first letter from my father in Starobelsk in October or November with a return address and a message saying that he would write to me once a month, and would be able to receive letters from me once a month.

Numerous publications which have appeared in the West since the war suggest that presumably about 9,000 active-duty and reserve officers were held in Starobelsk and Kozelsk, including 12 generals and one rear admiral. In turn, members of the police, military police, the Border Guard Corps, Polish intelligence, state officials and others belonging to, as it was put, the "apparatus of repression" were mainly sent to Ostashkov. A majority of the clergy were also placed there. Their total number, very incomplete anyway, is estimated to have been between 5,000 and 6,500 persons. In total, the number in all three camps is put by a majority of Western authors at 14,000 to 15,000 (their estimates are all we have).

It should be mentioned, however, that this number is very tentative, as the authors of the works emphasize themselves. When Soviet data are revealed, the number may turn out to be smaller or greater.

In 1977, the third edition of the so-called Katyn List prepared by Adam Moszynski appeared in London—a list of names of prisoners of war in Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov containing 9,888 names (only 1,260 names from the camp with the most prisoners, in Ostashkov). Nonetheless, it is obvious that a proper list could only be drawn up on the basis of Soviet documentation if the latter still remains in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

All of these camps were located in the compounds of former monasteries. Both the letters received by families and stories of those who survived suggest that the prisoners were treated rather well. Food was passable; highest-ranking officers were not required to work. Officers up to the rank of major worked, but this was not exceedingly hard labor. Generals were isolated from the rest of the officers; later, colonels also were added to them. At least this was the case in Starobelsk.

We should also add that Polish officers were not formally considered prisoners of war, because there was no state of war between Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Government did not sign the international convention on prisoners, and due to this did not feel obligated to comply with the provisions accepted in this matter.

Berling wrote in his memoirs about the conditions prevailing at Starobelsk (he was arrested in Wilno in October 1939).

"The camp was quite crowded. It turned out that there were about 2,000 enlisted men and noncommissioned officers at the camp who were waiting to be sent home... Shortly thereafter, the soldiers began to leave in groups. In their stead, large and small groups of officers appeared every day who were brought here from various places...

Life began to proceed according to the norms set for the camp... Good sanitary supervision and continuous medical care were provided, as well as a bath, a laundry facility, and so forth. There were also movies. The press was delivered to us, and we could use the library which was of inferior quality. We were allowed to maintain correspondence with our families, to be sure, in limited amounts... We received no pay, and purchases in the camp shop which supplied mainly shag, cigarettes, poor cologne, and occasionally butter and mutton sausage were made with the money we raised by selling to camp personnel our watches and unnecessary parts of our clothing..." (ARGUMENTY, 24 October 1982).

A book-memoir by Stanislaw Swianewicz (before the war, professor at the chair of political economy at the University of Wilno), entitled "In the Shade of Katyn" and published by the Literary Institute in Paris, is a narration on the Kozelsk Camp. In April 1940, the author was on a transport in the vicinity of Katyn, but at the last moment was taken off the transport for reasons which he himself does not understand; after doing time at several prisons and a labor camp, he ended up in the ranks of the Anders army in 1942.

He "arrived" in Kozelsk in early November 1939 after a short stay at a transit camp in the vicinity of Putivl (250 kilometers northeast of Kiev), in a village from which, as he states, the local population was temporarily moved out for the time the officers, who were brought there from various places, were being segregated.

Swianewicz writes:

"It became clear very shortly after our arrival in Kozelsk that this was primarily an investigative camp the purpose of which was to determine the character profile of every prisoner of war and classify the inmates into certain categories from the point of view of the Soviet security service, which was headed by the infamous Beriia... The entire team conducting these studies was headed by Brigade Commander Zarubin, a high-ranking NKVD official, a cultured person with a command of foreign languages, a very pleasant conversationalist. To a degree, he was reminiscent of the type of educated officers in the tsarist gendarmerie... Investigative officers in the ranks ranging mostly from lieutenant to major reported to him. Their task was to develop character profiles of individual prisoners...

The final synthesis of all reports was probably the purview of the brigade commander, who went to Moscow quite often and also visited Starobelsk and Ostashkov...

In Kozelsk, the prisoners were given the right to send letters to their families. In doing that, they had to give as their mailing address the "Gorkiy Rest House" in Kozelsk... Intensive religious life was a factor raising the spirit of many prisoners incredibly. We had a host of military chaplains in Kozelsk. Since everybody was in uniforms, the authorities understood that these were not regular officers only after a period of time... On Christmas Eve 1939, all members of the clergy, Catholic as well as Protestant and Orthodox, were arrested and sent away... ("In the Shade of Katyn," 3d edition, 196 [as published], pp. 96-100).

As far as the liquidation of the Kozelsk camp is concerned, the first transport from there left on 3 April 1943 [as published]. "From this point on, over April and early May 1943 [as published], about 300 persons, sometimes fewer, were regularly taken once every several days... In the period of liquidation of Kozelsk, extreme centralization of decisions on the future of individual prisoners became very obvious... I myself was a witness to the receipt of telephone orders from Moscow concerning individuals to be put on particular transports." (pp. 105-106).

#### In Light of Western Documents

Since the late 1940's, a tremendous number of articles and larger works on the topic of the mass liquidation of Polish officers in Kosogory has appeared in the West; the authors are mostly Polish, but also British, American and others. "The Katyn Crime in the Light of Documents" published in London is a collective work of which a dozen or so editions have appeared since 1948. "The Katyn Forest Massacre," a work prepared by a commission set up by the U.S. Congress to investigate the Katyn affair and published in December 1952, numbers 2,362 pages of print. A topical bibliography compiled by Z. Jagodzinski and published in London in 1982 includes 496 items.

All Western publications unambiguously point to Stalin and Beriya as the main decisionmakers behind the disposal of the Polish officers and do not call into question the fact that the Katyn tragedy occurred before the Soviet-German war. In any event, we cannot accept uncritically the statements of authors with regard to various details, dates, numbers, and so forth, because we have no access to Soviet archives and are not aware of the documents deposited there (if such documentation has survived). A relatively complete and genuine image of events and facts may only be obtained through research thus expanded.

During April 1940, all correspondence with Polish prisoner camps in the USSR ceased. My letter written to my father at this time returned 2 weeks later with the message someone added between the lines: "vybyl" [no

longer here; the Russian word is transliterated but not translated in the Polish original]. In all likelihood, the camps were liquidated during this very month and until mid-May.

As the accounts of surviving prisoners suggest, in March 1940 questionnaires were distributed in the camps to be filled out. Individual rubrics contained many personal questions. However, the goal of the questionnaire was supposedly to obtain responses to the question of where [a prisoner] intended to go once the camp was disbanded. In this rubric, one had to opt for one of the neutral states, a return to Poland, or staying in the Soviet Union.

It is known (for example, Berling writes about it in his memoirs) that an absolute majority of officers stated their desire to return to Poland. In turn, about 400 persons from all three camps who opted for staying in the Soviet Union were assembled at the locality of Pavlishchev Bor (between Smolensk and Kaluga), and subsequently taken far north, to Gryazovets in the vicinity of Vologda. This was a smaller camp where about 1,300 officers were held for a long time. All people from this camp, i. e., about 1,700, later ended up in the Anders army. After its evacuation, six of them remained in the Soviet Union in order to form new Polish units.

"When we embarked on the work of organizing a Polish division (this is a reference to the Kosciuszko division—note by T. P.) we compiled a list containing 600 names of officers whom we would have liked to bring to this division from the camps. We were taken to Moscow with this list in order to discuss the issue. We were received by Merkulov (Beriya's first deputy—note by T. P.) with Beriya in attendance. When the time came for personnel matters and we presented our list, a moment of silence set in over which Merkulov and Beriya examined the list, after which Merkulov said: 'My s etimi ludmi sdela li bol'shuyu oshibku!' [We have made a great mistake concerning these people; the Russian sentence is transliterated but not translated in the Polish original]. At this point, Beriya interjected: 'Etikh lyudey v Sovetskom Soyuze nyet... Oni uye khali za granitsu...' [These people are not in the Soviet Union... They have gone abroad; the Russian sentences are transliterated but not translated in the Polish original].

This did not surprise us... We knew that the camps were disbanded, that our colleagues had left, and that we, in keeping with our desire stated in the questionnaire, remained in the Soviet Union. I admit, however, that critical observations on this subject began to surface later..." Berling writes that much.

While organizing his corps in the USSR, Gen Anders also brought up the issue of Polish officers; he had several conversations about this matter with Stalin, Molotov and Vyshynskiy. However, as he writes in his

memoirs ("Without the Last Chapter"), he received evasive answers; a search conducted "on his own" by a special office set up by him (headed by Capt Czapski) did not turn up anything.

The first news of the discovery of mass graves in Katyn came from Berlin: on 13 April 1943, it was broadcast by a German radio station. Two days later, a communique by the Moscow radio denied the message arguing that these officers, while doing construction work in the area of Smolensk, fell into the hands of the Germans in the summer of 1941 and were killed by them.

For the German authorities, who used the discovery as much as possible in their propaganda against the Soviet Union, mainly with a view to weakening the unity of the coalition, it was not easy to organize an international commission for carrying out an investigation in Katyn. The International Red Cross in Geneva, which the Government of the Third Reich approached, announced that it would not undertake any action unless representatives of the Soviet Government were invited to the investigating team. Therefore, the Germans carried out their own investigation, bringing to Katyn, though not without difficulty, a group of scientists and forensic specialists from 12 European states in which Berlin had influence at the time (Dr Wodzinski, a Polish physician, was also among them). Their work was supervised by Dr Gerhard Buhtz, a German professor. In April and May, this commission inspected the corpses at Katyn. Occasionally, American, British and Polish officers from prisoner of war camps were also brought there.

Among other Polish officers, Lt Col Stefan Mossor (subjected to repressions after his return to Poland, in the late 1950's—Gen Div at the General Staff) was there. The following are excerpts from his account in July 1946 (following his promotion to Gen Brig, 4 years prior to his arrest):

"I saw Katyn personally at the time the graves were excavated. I was in a group of officers—Polish prisoners of war whom the Germans delivered from various camps to the Katyn clearing with a strong escort. We were to be a link in the propaganda [campaign] mounted by Goebbels on account of this mass murder... It is hard to describe what we, prisoners of war, felt standing there over excavated graves of thousands of our murdered brothers under the bayonettes of a strong escort of German field military police.

...Regardless of what we thought then at the location of the execution, and later when we were taken back behind the wire of the camps, we were aware of one thing: regardless of our personal view of this issue, we could not allow ourselves to be used as pawns of German propaganda... We refused to enter the Katyn clearing until the radio and filming equipment prepared there was removed." (POLSKA ZBROJNA, 1946, No 176)

On 10 June 1943, a report stating that over 4,000 corpses had been exhumed in Kosogory, mainly of those from the Kozelsk prisoner of war camp, was published in the German press. It was signed by the Secretary of the German State Police Ludwig Voss.

It should be noted at this point that Western works on the Katyn crime are based mainly on the documentation assembled by Germans at this time. It is supplemented by the accounts of survivors from Polish prisoner of war camps in the USSR and many persons who "have come to know" of the Katyn affair, as well as research materials and documents laboriously collected after the war. However, the expert study by the aforementioned German commission, the report by Gerhard Buhtz who headed the forensic inquiry and facts related to the German-supervised work remain the primary source.

#### Later Came Silence

The Soviet Union brought up the Katyn issue again in February 1946, during the Nuremberg trial, when the Soviet prosecutor Col Pokrovskiy described the attitude of Germans to Soviet prisoners of war. In this context, he also referred to the communique of the Soviet Special Commission of 26 January 1944 regarding the Katyn affair, stating that "all victims were killed by shots in the back of the neck which was the characteristic method of Hitlerite murderers striving to exterminate the Slavs." However, the Katyn tragedy was not mentioned in the text of the final sentence read on 30 September and 1 October 1946. In the records of the trial, there is no mention of whether the Katyn issue was removed in keeping with the request of the German defense which pointed out several inaccuracies in the Soviet document, or whether it was omitted pursuant to the principle adopted by the International Tribunal in Nuremberg that in the wording of the sentence only the crimes completely proven in the course of the trial were to be mentioned. (Based on the transcript and documents on the course of the Katyn affair in Nuremberg between February and July 1946).

Since 1985, a campaign of revealing the crimes committed by Stalin and Beriia against Soviet political and military leaders, scientific and cultural personalities has been under way in the Soviet Union. The Soviet press reports that in various areas of the European part of the USSR (e.g., in Kuropaty) graves of thousands of victims who were killed in the years of Stalinist repressions in a manner similar to that observed in Katyn have been discovered. The decisionmakers of these times are now dead. Beriia and his first deputy Merkulov were shot in December 1953 by the sentence of a Soviet court. If we assume that the information is correct that mainly the officers held at Kozelsk ended up in Katyn, then what happened to the thousands of prisoners kept at Starobelsk and Ostashkov?

Relatively recently a certain Swiatka-Horyn, permanently residing in London, put the blame for Katyn on the Gestapo in a brochure entitled "The Katyn Forest," published supposedly at his own expense. In a pointed response to this brochure ("New Revelations' Concerning the Katyn Issue," ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 27 January 1989), Prof. W. T. Kowalski wrote correctly that the account by the author "would have certainly made it big in the early 1950's but at present it merely interferes with clearing up the matter."

In July 1987, Wojciech Jaruzelski, writing about the antileninist policy of the Soviet Government with regard to Poland in 1939 through 1941, in an article published in the magazine KOMMUNIST (No 11), formulated several truths which open the way for elucidating the unexplained issues. Similar emphases could also be discerned in his later statements, including the one in the Sejm. During his visit to Poland, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke about the need for an honest approach to history, for "facing up to the truth," regardless of whether it happens to be bitter or sweet.

Recently, Ryszard Wojna recalled this in the government organ RZECZPOSPOLITA (8 February 1989) writing that public impatience cannot be ignored, that discussions on crimes committed against Polish women [apparent misprint; "Poles" is called for] in prisoner of war camps in the USSR "can no longer proceed only behind closed doors."

When asked by POLITYKA whether the Katyn issue was raised in Nuremberg, Eryk Lipinski, who was one of the Polish correspondents at the Nuremberg trial, said: "At the beginning of the trial, we received a thick stack of sheets which enumerated all Hitlerite crimes. Killing even one person was mentioned in much detail, but there was not a word on Katyn. Therefore, I approached the Soviet prosecutor Col Smirnov with a question about the reasons why the Katyn crime, which was, after all, officially attributed to the Germans, was not mentioned in this very thorough list (as is known, Polish prosecutors were not allowed to appear at this trial, and we were represented by Soviet prosecutors). Col Smirnov did not respond to my question right away. He looked me straight in the eye and, after a pause, said: 'Tovarishch leytenant (I was in uniform), Katyn—eto drugoye delo...' [Comrade lieutenant, Katyn is a different matter; the Russian sentence is transliterated but not translated in the Polish original]."

The memory of Katyn should not bring out in us a blind hatred, it should not give our enemies a chance for yet another provocation. Now, after decades have passed, a complete elucidation of the Katyn issue should become a symbol of our joint will in our effort to finally cancel the register of issues which cast a shadow over Polish-Soviet relations.

**October 1988 Media Developments, Changes**  
26000299a Warsaw PRASA POLSKA in Polish  
No 12, Dec 88 pp 53-57

[Unattributed reports: "Chronicle"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

**4 October:** A plenum of the Main Board of the Union of Polish Writers decided to create three new literary journals: two weeklies, one of which is to be devoted to presenting the literary work of young writers, and a monthly ARKONA to be published in Bydgoszcz. [passage omitted]

**5 October:** A new biweekly SWIAT KSIĄZKI has appeared. [passage omitted]

**5 October:** At the Warsaw House of Journalists, the Socio-Legal Journalists Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on crime and law violations, the proposed law on associations, and on passport problems. [passage omitted]

**7 October:** After an interruption of many years, publication of the literary and musical quarterly SPIEWAK SLASKI, which is the journal of the Polish Union of Choirs and Orchestras in Katowice, has resumed. [passage omitted]

**10 October:** At the Warsaw House of Journalists, the Polonia Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with Stanley Adamski, the initiator of the Polish-Polonia Ecology Foundation, on the activities of the foundation, questions of environmental protection, and problems of foreign enterprises in Poland.

An added attraction at the meeting was the showing of films illustrating modern technology in the field of environmental protection. [passage omitted]

**11-12 October:** In Katowice, there was an all-Polish session for journalists devoted to the achievements, current problems, and prospects for Polish-Soviet economic and scientific and technical cooperation. Special emphasis was placed on broadening direct links. The organizers of the session were the Voivodship Board of the Society for Polish-Soviet Friendship and the Katowice section of the "Friendship" Journalists Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland.

On the first day, the journalists visited 10 plants and research and design institutes that have been cooperating with Soviet partners for years. On the second day, they participated in a discussion with representatives of the

Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade, Polish central foreign trade agencies, the Club of Exporters to the USSR, and the USSR Trade Representative in Poland.

In addition to the representatives of the 25 Polish editorial offices, accredited representatives of the Soviet press in Poland also participated in the session. The latter also visited the editorial offices of TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA, where they discussed the role of the mass media in objective, reliable presentation of bilateral Polish-Soviet cooperation.

**12 October:** At the Warsaw House of Journalists, the Industrial Plant Journalists Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with Dr Janusz Dsica of the Department of Journalism and Political Science at Warsaw University. The club's guest spoke about the problems of the 70th anniversary of the rebuilding of the Polish state. [passage omitted]

**13 October:** At the Warsaw House of Soviet Science and Culture, the "Friendship" Journalists Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with Soviet scientists and journalists on nationality policy in the USSR.

**14 October:** A new catholic-social quarterly, ODPOWIEDZIALNOSC I CZYN, published by the society "Responsibility and Action," has appeared. The editor in chief is Jerzy Ozdowski. [passage omitted]

**15 October:** Zygfryd Cegiela has been removed from his position as deputy editor in chief of KRAJOBRAZOW.

Eugeniusz Pietruszkiewicz was asked to serve as the deputy editor in chief of KRAJOBRAZOW. [passage omitted]

**17 October:** A delegation of Chinese journalist lawyers, led by Guan Zhki Hao, chairman of the Journalists Association of the PRC, paid a visit to the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland. The editors of PRAWO I ZYCIE were the hosts for the delegation. Jan Brodzki, the chairman of the Socio-Legal Journalists Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland and chairman of the Main Journalist Court, met with the Chinese journalists and described the work of the club in shaping the legal awareness of society, and in improving the qualifications of socio-legal journalists; he also described the tasks of the Main Journalist Court in caring for the implementation of the deontological principles by the journalist community for the Chinese journalists.

The Chinese journalists were interested in, among other things, the provisions of the Press Law and especially in the problem of professional secrecy for journalists. [passage omitted]

**17-23 October:** A group of journalists from Lvov visited Bydgoszcz: Svetlana Pietrush (KRASNOYE ZNAMIA), Maria Shutovska (PROMIN), Bogdan Dasiv (LENINSKOYE SLOVO), and Grigoriy Shramko (LVOVSKIY ZHELEZNODOROZHNIK). They were the guests of the regional section of the "Friendship" Journalists Club of the Kujawy-Pomorzé Section of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland in Bydgoszcz.

The journalists from Lvov familiarized themselves with many aspects of the political and economic life of the region and its value as a tourist attraction. They were received by Ryszard Zawiszewski, first secretary of the Bydgoszcz PZPR Voivodship Committee and also met with the lecturers of the Voivodship Committee and the PZPR City Committee who deal with Soviet issues. A meeting with the activists of the section of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland and its deputy chairman Maciej Kaminski, was a forum for the exchange of views on many subjects. Tadeusz Filipowicz, chairman of the Voivodship Board of the Society for Polish Soviet Friendship, and Leonard Prusiewicz, deputy director of the Pomorzé Press Publishers, also participated in the meeting. [passage omitted]

**21 October:** At the Warsaw Journalists House, the Political and Social Journalists Club of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland organized a meeting with the deputy chairman of the OPZZ to discuss prices, wages, living standards, the state of the economy, and society's mood as judged by the trade unions. [passage omitted]

**23 October:** A new journal THE WARSAW VOICE, a weekly in the English language for foreigners in Poland, has appeared. [passage omitted]

**28 October:** Slawomir Darzycki has been named to the position of editor in chief of the weekly NAD WARTA.

Barbara Wrzesinska has been removed from the position of editor in chief of the weekly NAD WARTA. [passage omitted]

**31 October:** Jerzy Ambroziewicz has been removed from the position of Interpress Press Agency correspondent in Rome.

**31 October:** A new weekly GAZETA BANKOWA, published by the partnership Management and Banking, Inc., has appeared. Ryszard Kowalski is the editor in chief. Among those on the editorial staff are Piotr Aleksandrowicz, Stefan Bratkowski, Dariusz Fikus, Jakub Kopec.

**Party Activities Calendar 5-18 December 1988**

26000299b Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish  
No 26, 28 Dec 88

[Unattributed report: "Party Chronicle 5-18 December 1988"]

[Text]

**Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee**

**6 December.** The Politburo discussed the preparations for the 10th plenum of the Central Committee and set up a plan for further work; it examined reports on agreements made by the party-government commission which dealt with the proposed plan for consolidating the economy; it familiarized itself with the course of the visit and the results of the talks by M.F. Rakowski in Austria and in the GDR; it heard a report on the "Russian Federation Days in Poland."

**13 December.** The Politburo accepted the proposed materials for the 10th plenum of the Central Committee; it adopted a resolution on the introduction of new experimental organizational measures and methods of party operations in the Slupsk, Legnice, and Koszalin Voivodships; it discussed the conception of the self-governments and economic chambers; it familiarized itself with reports on Polish aid for the victims of the catastrophe in Armenia.

**14 December.** Wojciech Jaruzelski presided over a consultative meeting of the members of the party Central Committee. The participants examined the materials for the 10th plenum of the Central Committee and set the date for 20-21 December 1988.

On this same day, there was a conference of the Secretariat of the Central Committee with the first secretaries of the party voivodship committees and the heads of the sections of the Central Committee. The participants discussed the most important current problems in party work.

**Conferences and Meetings**

**7 December.** Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State, participated in the opening of the Second Congress for the Cultivation of the Polish Language in Katowice. W. Jaruzelski met with the aktiv of the plants in, and of the city of, Raciborz and visited the Carbon Electrode Plant.

The Central Committee Commission on Internal Party Affairs and Party Activities in the Representative Bodies and State Administration examined proposed changes in the structure of the voivodship committees in Slupsk, Legnice, and Koszalin. Kazimierz Cypryński, secretary of the Central Committee, presided over the deliberations.

**8 December.** Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee, received Dragoljub Djordjevic, the director of the Jugoslaviapublik Publishers, who presented Jaruzelski with a special author's copy of the collection of the speeches of Wojciech Jaruzelski published in Yugoslavia.

Wladyslaw Baka, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo, met with a group of 100 first secretaries of factory committees from industrial plants that have distinguished themselves under the economic reform. They discussed practical experience in the forms and methods of factory-level work by the party organizations.

**9 December.** Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, received Amath Dansokho, secretary general of the Party of Independence and Labor of Senegal. Ernest Kucza, head of the Foreign Section of the Central Committee, participated in the meeting.

Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee, received the leadership of the Main Council of the Association of Polish Students, who described the situation in the student movement and the organization's plans for the near future.

**12 December.** Andrzej Wasilewski, secretary of the Central Committee, presented the current problems in cultural policy at a meeting with journalists of the Association of Journalists of the People's Republic of Poland.

**14 December.** A meeting of the Presidium of the PZPR Central Control and Review Commission was held. Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee, participated in the meeting. The participants discussed the preparations for the sixth plenum of the Central Control and Review Commission and adopted the directions of activity for the Commission prior to the National Conference of Delegates. Włodzimierz Mokrzyszczak, the chairman of the Central Control and Review Commission, presided over the deliberations.

**15 December.** On the 40th anniversary of the Union Congress of the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Socialist Party, a ceremonial meeting of merited activists and living delegates to the historic congress and of representatives of various generations and political groups was held in the hall of the Warsaw Polytechnic. Members of the highest party and state authorities including Wojciech Jaruzelski participated in the ceremonies.

Wladyslaw Baka, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo, met with representatives of the League of Polish Women. They discussed the achievements and major directions of the organization's activities.

**16 December.** In conjunction with the 40th anniversary of TRYBUNA LUDU, an open meeting of the paper's party organization was held at the building of the PZPR Central Committee. Wojciech Jaruzelski, first secretary of the Central Committee, and Janusz Kubasiewicz, candidate member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Warsaw Voivodship Committee, participated in the meeting.

At the party course center in Warsaw, a 2-day seminar for the heads of the personnel policy sections of the PZPR voivodship committees ended. It was devoted to an exchange of information on implementing the new procedure for naming and removing management personnel, to new forms of work with the personnel reserve, and to the prospects for the development of a coalition style of handling personnel policy. Jerzy Swiderski, head of the Central Committee Personnel Policy Section, participated in the seminar.

#### **In the Offices and Organizations**

**5 December.** The Radom Voivodship Committee devoted its deliberations to the problem of party work in rural communities, including the need to adopt the role of the PZPR units to the needs of a changing agriculture.

Jozef Baryla, member of the Politburo, met with the members of his parent basic party organization and the sociopolitical aktiv of the Eltra Radio Plant in Bydgoszcz.

**7 December.** The Skierniewice PZPR Voivodship Committee, the ZSL Voivodship Committee, and the SD Voivodship Committee held a joint plenum. They discussed the cooperation of the PZPR, ZSL, and SD in the acceleration of the sociopolitical changes in the voivodship.

**8 December.** The Szczecin Voivodship Committee discussed the state and program for the development of the municipal services in Szczecin through 2000. During the organizational portion of the plenum, a change was made in the position of secretary of the Voivodship Committee for political and organizational affairs. In conjunction with Stefan Rogalski taking over the function of chairman of the Voivodship People's Council, Wladyslaw Kaczanowski, previously the head of the political organizational section of the voivodship committee, was named the new secretary.

**10 December.** Jan Glowczyk, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo, participated in a meeting of representatives of various youth groups in the Olsztyn Voivodship.

**12 December.** Representatives of the veterans of the workers movement and the delegations to the Union Congress living in the capital city met with the Executive

Committee of the PZPR Warsaw Committee. Janusz Kubasiewicz, candidate member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Voivodship Committee, participated in the meeting.

In Wroclaw, a meeting of the veterans of the workers' movement, activists of the PZPR from the largest industrial plants in Wroclaw and the voivodship, young farmers, and outstanding activists of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth was held. Marian Orzechowski, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo, participated in the meeting.

**13 December.** The Kielce Voivodship Committee devoted its plenum to the 40th anniversary of the PZPR, its achievements in the Swietokrzyski area and its role in the process of transforming the economy and the state.

**14 December.** The Poznan Voivodship Committee discussed the tasks in the area of ideological and propaganda operations of the voivodship party organization. Gabriela Rembisz, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo, and Andrzej Czyz, head of the Ideology Section of the Central Committee, participated in the meeting.

**16 December.** The Koszalin PZPR Voivodship Committee and ZSL Voivodship Committee held a joint plenum to discuss the problems in agriculture.

The Legnica Voivodship Plenum discussed the tasks of the voivodship party organization in the economic strategy.

**17 December.** The Opole Voivodship Committee discussed the tasks of the members of the party active in the people's councils. Zbigniew Michalek, secretary of the Central Committee and candidate member of the Politburo, participated in the deliberations.

The Elblag Voivodship committee examined the subject of self-government and civic involvement in the implementation of the economic reform.

The Sieradz Voivodship Committee discussed the changes in the operation of the offices and party organizations in the voivodship.

The Jelenia Gora Voivodship Committee discussed the tasks of the voivodship party organization in maintaining and enriching the national culture.

The Ciechanow Voivodship Committee discussed the work of the rural self-governments.

The Siedlce Voivodship Committee at a joint meeting with the Voivodship Control and Review Commission defined the tasks of the party units in implementing the reform in the voivodship.

### Interparty Cooperation

**5 December.** Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, member of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo and president of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland, who was making a 2-day working friendly visit to the GDR, was received by Erich Honecker, secretary general of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State.

**8 December.** A delegation of the Budapest Committee of the MSZMP has ended a 2-day working visit in Warsaw. Mihaly Jasso, chairman of the delegation, member of the MSZMP Central Committee, and first secretary of the MSZMP Budapest Committee, was received by Jozef Czyrek, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and member of the Politburo.

**9 December.** Wladyslaw Baka, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo, who made a working visit to Prague, was received by Milosz Jakesz, secretary general of the CPCZ Central Committee. During talks with Jozef Lenart, secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, Wladyslaw Baka discussed questions of bilateral cooperation, especially scientific and technical cooperation through 2000.

**13 December.** A group of lecturers of the CPSU Central Committee visited Poland. It was lead by W. Shapko, consultant to the Party Work Organizational Section of the Central Committee. Andrzej Czyz, head of the Ideology Section of the PZPR Central Committee, received the Soviet lecturers.

**12-15 December.** A delegation of the Political and Organizational Section of the CPCZ Central Committee led by Jiri Salhary, deputy head of the section, visited Poland. Kazimierz Cypryński, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, received the delegation.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Political Career of Morina Reviewed

28000075 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
31 Jan 89 pp 16-17

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "The New Custodian of the Peonies"]

[Text] The lights went out in a section of Pristina just before the beginning of the meeting at which Rahman Morina, until recently the head of the provincial police, was enthroned as the leader of Kosovo Communists! There is no doubt that his opponents (said to be numerous) will interpret this outage as a "symbolic gesture of Providence"; but there is still less doubt that such interpretations can rattle this ice-cold professional policeman "on temporary duty in politics." Morina, that is, has already become accustomed to answering questions—Is his interest in politics only a hobby, a normal turn in the career of a man at the top of the Kosovo

administration, the result of a sense of "mission," or simply the effect of a Yugoslav trend whereby police chiefs are becoming more and more involved in politics (Pavle Gazi, Svetomir Lalevic, Tomaz Ertl, Dusko Zgonjanin), while the ideologues resort more and more frequently to the favorite methods of police inquisition? Probably only the net result of answers to all the questions provides a solution, and that would not be complete, as to why Rahman Morina was given this mandate, which one would say is the most sensitive, as governor of Kosovo?

When the vote was over, the election seemed unusually logical. That is, Morina has been changing at least as much as the situation in Kosovo, and it is natural that at the zero point of the intersection of those two metamorphoses one should take over the responsibility for the other. The external factors that occur when the term of office begins are, then, these: a definitive break between the previous Kosovo leadership and the leader of Serbia; refusal of "civil obedience" on the part of the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins to politicians who have lost their confidence; establishment of a fourth parallel system of authority, this time an "Albanian" system alongside the already existing Serbian system, the illegal separatist system, and the impotent official system; a sharp cleavage of Kosovo's party members into Slavs and Albanians; a threat to dissolve the provincial committee of the LC; loss of face by the "Albanianized" police and the acceptance of a federal police contingent as "peace-keeping forces of the united Yugoslav nations"; continuation of the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins, although less is said officially about the numbers; establishment of Albanian public opinion—so far an unknown category in the Kosovo political herbarium—and the first protests which are not said to have been organized from illegal separatist centers. Although it sounds paradoxical (for that matter, what in our politics is not), this beginning of Morina's political career is reminiscent of when Azem Vlasi came to power. Both reached the top with the strong support of the Serbian center, accompanied by the cautious waiting and watching by the broadest masses in Kosovo. The story has been repeated that once again on this occasion, faced with the choice between Husamedin Azemi and Ali Sukrija, both of whom were proposed to head the Kosovo Provincial Committee of the LC, the Presidium of Serbian Communists decided to support Rahman Morina, emphasizing that it was doing so—"especially because of his principled position related to the November events in Pristina." The reference, of course, is to the demonstrations or protests of Albanians on the occasion of the departure of Azem Vlasi and Kacusa Jasari from the top Kosovo leadership.

The leaders of the Serbian Communists judged correctly that the reputation of Azemi and Sukrija among Albanians did not guarantee a majority support for their election. That is why they decided on what appears to have been the less popular variant—that the relatively unusual choice of a professional politician to head the

party would be offset by the gain derived from the impact of his sharp criticism and conflict with the previous top leadership of Kosovo and the feeling that the payments on the loan taken had to be "made regularly." Which brings us to the second factor, the internal factor, which advanced Morina to the position of commander in chief. After working for long years in Belgrade in the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, at the beginning of the decade Morina went back to Kosovo as a professional adviser to the peace and order force there. Although he had cordial relations with a majority of the top people in Kosovo, he was considered a "second-rater" specialized in security matters. Although somewhat older, he was an integral part of the team which was after a fashion created by the ideology of the Azem Vlasi cabinet. Ambitious, but also subject to numerous assessments because of the successes and shortcomings of the Kosovo police, Morina learned from the causes of the fall of Vlasi and Kacusa Jasari. Vlasi was trying to govern Kosovo by the most thankless of all existing models of government—as a leader without a firm ethnic base, right up until November the Albanians did not forgive him the "Belgrade ethnogenesis" of his position, and the Serbs were disappointed that ethnic leaders enthroned in protest rallies did not break through to the top leadership of the province with the help anticipated from Vlasi. Like a tightrope walker balancing between moves of measured strength, so that they would not be perceived by the Albanian majority as a "loss of rights already acquired," and the necessary changes which were supposed to convince the Slavs in Kosovo of the determination of the Kosovo administration to guarantee them personal and ethnic security and safety of their property, when support in Serbia was removed, Vlasi found himself politically "in no-man's-land" and ethnically on the side of the newly formed and vociferous Albanian majority.

With the instinct of a consummate policeman and the wisdom of a man who knows that anything can happen to him at any time, Morina felt the fine vibrations of the change in Vlasi's position relative to the Serbian center (in both directions), and regardless of the political rules that apply in relations between the police and the League of Communists, he negotiated a sharp public deviation from the entire team of Vlasi's Young Turks. Although the analysts say that this occurred only after the November rumblings, for all practical purposes Morina left Vlasi's team in September, when in an interview with a Belgrade daily newspaper he directly accused the politician here of opportunism and powerlessness in resolving the Kosovo problem. In a meeting of Serbs in the village Priluzje in early November, that is, before the Albanian protests, in answer to the question "Would it cause large-scale Albanian protests if Vlasi and Jasari were removed?" Morina answered, "That is a rumor being spread by streetcar conductors. Those who say that underestimate the Albanian working class; it is not so blind as to be taken in by manipulation. There is evidence of this in the fact that the Albanians did not oppose even the fall of some people who had already

risen to divinity thanks to manipulation." Morina made an effective point of the "case of Hodza," but still, only 10 days later, Albanians did pour out into the streets of Kosovo, including the working class, protesting because of the departure of the top Kosovo leaders. The mistaken forecast became a question of honor for Morina, and his department established with a speed not seen before that the protests had not been organized by separatist circles, but by official circles in the province. A list of some 50 organizers has already been turned over to higher republic and federal authorities, and the strings attached to that list will probably be followed back to one of the former leaders. Regardless of whether Azem Vlasi is directly accused of "organizing" or at least "inciting" the unrest and protests, by destroying the previous team Morina will have a chance of building up the same kind of reserve and initial capital with the higher authorities as Vlasi did in his time by distancing himself from the policy of Fadil Hodza.

Nor did Morina's "Copernican revolution" escape the newspapermen. Through a simple comparison of his two extensive interviews, the first dating from May and the second from September of last year, the conclusion was drawn that he had changed some of his assessments, he passed over some of his observations in silence, and he made some new points public for the first time. BORBA and its author, the malicious Slavko Curuvija, went further in this kind of dissection. He noted that at first Morina had spoken vitriolically about the large-scale Serb-Montenegrin demonstrations "in which there was hostile or nationalistic expression of extreme individuals who had an adverse influence on the way those meetings developed," since "those individuals were actively involved in preparing and organizing those meetings, which indicates that they have been operating deliberately from those positions, with aspirations to manipulate the mass and set themselves up in the role of leader." Back in May, Morina added that these "individuals are behaving in an uncontrolled and extreme way, attacking bodies of leadership at all levels, government agencies and party forums, the Constitution and the system as a whole," and then that "the Serb and Montenegrin nationalists are trying to impose extremely unacceptable demands contrary to the policy of the LCY" and that "they are establishing cooperation with the bourgeois right and Serbian nationalists outside Kosovo." BORBA noted that in the new interview Morina did not mention this topic, and he mentioned Kosovo Polje only once, and then in this context: "At one point, a high official requested the department's intervention in Kosovo Polje, but we refused. We called for the comrades in the province and the republic to agree on the directions of political action so that specific tasks could then follow from that."

Immediately after the first interview (and even earlier though with somewhat less of a charge), "well-informed" circles in Kosovo Polje came forward, emphasizing that not only were the department's results unsatisfactory, but that the head of that department, Rahman Morina,

had built a weekend cottage on Serbian land taken away from peasants in Sirinacka Zupa (Brezovica). This report turned out to be accurate and there is no building permit for the structure.

Matters even went a step further, and the newspapers printed a picture of the weekend cottage in question, and Morina's name was mentioned more and more frequently in the rallies of Serbs and Montenegrins in a context that was not exactly laudatory. Then the chief of police officially explained that he had bought the land from the peasants, not from the government, and that for him it is "a particular pleasure when Uncle Staja, from whom he bought the lot, stops by for them to drink a cup of coffee prepared by his wife Bratislava." (His wife Bratislava is a Serb born in Nis—A.T.) The explanation, a new interview, an obvious increase in the distance from the governing team of Kosovo and in particular the precise statement concerning the November demonstrations of Albanians definitively promoted Morina to the position of a first-rate political figure who could not be passed over in the new personnel lineups. Unquestionably courageous, starting out with the initial capital of the confidence of the top republic leadership and the support of that portion of the Kosovo public which is

demanding results of some kind, in the early period of his tenure Morina can neither be an ideologue, which does not suit him anyway, nor a conventional politician; his role today is that of a team manager who between two fires must form a lineup capable of proving that Kosovo is able to function as an integral, but in many ways also separate, part of a renewed Serbia. As he does his job, he will be closely evaluated as to "how Albanian he is," as to "how independent he is of Belgrade," and as to how well he understands the troubles of the Serbs in Kosovo. In all this, he dare not forget for a moment that Serbian criticism of him has been postponed only temporarily. In that context, it need not mean anything in particular that the department which he headed has not been given a passing grade, but he has; nor need one believe the definition of his colleague Dusko Zgonjanin, until recently the head of the Bosnian police, who, inspired by the new events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said: "Woe be to a system in which the process of democratization is guided by the police!"

Why so much pessimism directed against the department? Moreover, in advance? Because today, as a Belgrade citizen who has been silenced has said, even UDBA does not work for the police!

## INTRABLOC

**Bloc Exploration of Oceanic Resources Detailed**  
 26000305 Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC in Polish  
 No 47, 20 Nov 88 p 7

[Article by Zenon Komorowski: "Underwater Geology"]

[Text] "Oil on the Bottom of the North Sea," "Gold on the Alaskan Coast," "Iron and Manganese From the Pacific Ocean." New geologic ocean discoveries are reported almost every day. This new field has been experiencing a turbulent development in recent decades. It has an enormous future, because the seas and oceans constitute almost 70 percent of the earth's surface. They are the source of many valuable minerals.

The pioneers of underwater mining were the offshore oil drillers, who began to drill on the Caspian Sea and in America—on the coast of Venezuela and the United States, at the beginning of this century. At present, 75 countries are conducting explorations for oil and gas on the bottom of the sea and drilling platforms can be seen in almost every part of the globe. It is estimated that almost 40 percent of the world's potential reserves of oil and gas are in undersea deposits.

The seas and oceans may, in the future, become huge mines of metallic ore and other minerals. In different regions of the world undersea mines are already in operation. On the coast of Japan, rich concentrates of magnetite are being exploited. Heavy minerals such as ilmenite, magnetite, and titanium and zirconium ore, are being extracted on the coast of the United States, Brazil, West Africa and Ceylon. Similar sands in the Gulf of Alaska and Nome contain large amounts of gold, which is already being mined from the sea on an industrial scale. For a long time we have been obtaining large amounts of diamonds from the South African shelf. Theoretical and laboratory research and semi-technical experiments are being conducted in the Soviet Union on the obtainment of gold, silver and platinum from sea- and ocean-bottom deposits.

The depletion of land mineral deposits has made it necessary to search for the geologic resources of the ocean. Joint exploitation of the world's ocean bottoms by CEMA-member countries may, in the future, be an important source in meeting the requirements of our economy for certain minerals. Since 1972 Poland has been a participant of the international agreement INTERMORGE, which provides for the cooperation of the socialist states in the geologic study of oceans and seas. Over a period of 16 years of INTERMORGE activity, a great deal has been learned and valuable experience relating to methods, engineering and organization has been obtained.

Our participation until now has included cooperation in the study of Baltic Sea sediments, the development of scientific apparatus and equipment for geologic sea

studies, and work relating to marine pollution control. Polish specialists have also taken part in reconnaissance geologic expeditions in the Atlantic Ocean, on GDR and USSR ships.

For several years Poland has been conducting geologic studies on the Baltic Sea. Maps of sediments in the Polish sector of the Baltic have been prepared in our country and they have been found to be excellent. We are also conducting studies on the geologic construction of the Baltic bottom, which has resulted in the discovery of deposits of amber in the Gulf of Gdansk. These studies are valuable not only for geology but also for work in the field of water engineering and pollution control. The result of our studies was an accurate identification, from the geologic standpoint, of Slupsk Shoal, where beds of gravel and sand suitable for construction purposes were discovered.

Identification was also made on our coast, on Odra Shoal, of an agglomeration of heavy minerals and varieties of precious sand for the glass industry. Polish studies on marine pollution control during geological exploration and during exploitation of underwater mineral reserves are very valuable.

In recent years INTERMORGE has begun to organize large geologic expeditions aimed at identifying minerals on the ocean bottom. During 1981-87, 14 such expeditions set out on Soviet oceanographic ships. They studied sediments at a depth of approximately 4-6 km, in which metallic concretions appear. These are agglomerations of various metals deposited on the ocean bottom in the form of relatively easy-to-extract chunks.

The geologists were interested in the appearance of iron, nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese in the sediments. As long-range studies show, the manganese reserves at the bottom of the seas are 40 times larger than those on land. Nickel reserves are 90 times larger, and cobalt reserves as much as 600 times larger. Furthermore, there is almost 10 times more copper, molybdenum and zinc in the ocean than on land.

Initially the studies covered only the Atlantic, but gradually they were expanded to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Most of the work was focused on the study of iron-manganese concretions. New regions of undersea reserves of these metals were identified. The concretions formed in the seas have a much higher concentration of metals than those found in land deposits.

The work done thus far has resulted in detailed geologic maps of selected regions of sea bottoms. Scholars from the USSR and Czechoslovakia jointly prepared an "Atlas of Morphological Types of Iron-Manganese Concretions in the Pacific Ocean." It is planned that similar atlases covering all seas and oceans will be prepared.

It should be mentioned that similar studies are being conducted in the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France and the FRG. An international team of scholars has constructed a new map of iron-manganese concretions in the Pacific Ocean. The map, produced under the sponsorship of the International Society of Oceanographic Institutes, shows the major regions in which these concretions appear. To construct the map, data from over 2,500 detailed underwater soundings was used.

Last year a new organization, INTEROCEANMETAL, was formed. Its task is to conduct work in the area of exploration, identification and preparation for industrial exploitation of iron-manganese concretions from the bottom of the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. In addition to Poland, the organization is made up of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, the GDR, Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

INTEROCEANMETAL, formed by socialist states, is an open organization and all interested countries can join. Its headquarters is in Szczecin due to its geographic location—it provides the best access to the Atlantic and has well-developed scientific and technical facilities. It already has a trained scientific cadre. Research problems can be dealt with by the Szczecin University and Polytechnic.

The Szczecin Shipyard has a great deal of experience in building various types of research vessels, including oceanographic vessels and those used in marine geology. We also have experience in new research methods and the construction of apparatus and equipment. Many new methods and technologies applied in land geology and mining can be used in marine geology and in the study of ocean bottoms. This applies also to various types of laboratory studies of geologic samples from the ocean bottom.

It should be mentioned that in a few countries—Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union—the first attempts at industrial exploitation of minerals from the ocean depths are already being made. In the Oceanology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences semi-technical attempts have even been made to precipitate gold, silver and uranium from sea water. This chemical-technical experiment draws attention to the sea as a source of many minerals.

As the center of interest in marine geology, iron-manganese concretions are irregularly-shaped chunks about 3-5 cm in diameter. They contain manganese, iron, nickel, copper, cobalt and other elements. The distribution of the concretions is approximately 4 to 45 kg per square meter of sea bottom, sometimes reaching even 75 kg/sq m. These deposits are formed mainly at a depth of 3,500 to 6,000 meters and, as opposed to land reserves, they are renewable—they precipitate from sea water. Therefore, this undersea treasure is practically inexhaustible. Metals in the concretions appear which Poland has to

import. That is why our country is interested in the feasibility of exploiting the underwater reserves. But this is possible only with the broad cooperation of other CEMA states, as a joint effort.

At present INTEROCEANMETAL's most important task is to locate future areas which will make it possible to begin industrial exploitation of undersea beds. The study of metallic concretions is not only a scientific problem but a political and economic problem. It will probably be possible to begin the exploitation of undersea resources at the turn of the century. But we have to think much earlier about the possibility of utilizing mineral reserves from the ocean depths. The Preparatory Commission of the International Organization for the Bottom of the Sea, appointed by the Law of the Sea Convention, will control the utilization of underwater reserves in those regions which are outside the area of national jurisdictions. We must begin research work earlier in order to obtain, in the future, a specific "plot" on the ocean bottom and the right to exploit underwater resources.

## HUNGARY

**Publication of Economic Indicators Urged**  
25000101a Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
19 Jan 89 pp 1, 4

[Article by Vilmos Falubiro: "Taboos, Indexes, Blacklists: 'Secretocracy'"]

[Text] Although it is fact and reality that openness has increased, it would be an exaggeration to say that this is a turnaround because there is still no breakthrough in the flow of authoritative economic information.

Already when the most recent regulations governing state secrets and the protection of state secrets were promulgated in Spring 1987, one could tell that they were not keeping pace with our times. Since then it has become increasingly easy to recognize that the functioning of the already overly broad "confidential sphere" is a bit contradictory.

Access to free information is limited primarily by some principles of secrecy, in which one may well recognize the ossified characteristics of the earlier institutional system. The regulation of confidential matters was rewritten once again during the first half of 1987 (Decree with the Force of Law No 5 of 1987). At that point the economic and social stabilization and evolutionary program was not yet on the agenda. The premature birth [of the decree] much rather favored the survival of anachronistic features than the dissolving of the spirit inherited from the 1950's. This is so, even though all this weakens the beneficial effects of liberalization, which in the meantime have begun to spin at a faster rate. The situation is similar in regard to the 1984 press law, the renewal of which was supported recently by the MSZMP Politburo.

Yes, but that oft-mentioned openness in the flow of economic information has not received, and until now could not have received the kind of emphasis its importance deserves. The possibility ["danger"] that for one or another reason important information remains concealed and that the protection of secrets becomes self serving continues. And this is hardly acceptable.

The concept of economic openness is multifaceted and diverse. One of the most significant and most involved profiles is the enterprise balance sheet. Aside from the fact that it is difficult to obtain access to such documents, the balance sheets of 60 or 70 Hungarian enterprises, complete with all their attachments are secret, and the balance sheets of about 10 are particularly secret. Quite naturally, not only the individual enterprise balance sheets, but also the summaries of those categorized per industry branch must also be treated as confidential. For example, because of the uranium mine at Pecs, data pertaining to ore mining are also treated as top secrets. But above all, the people's economy balance which summarizes all the individual balances is a top secret, and so is the "quick report" composed of these, together with attachments, such as reports on losing enterprises.

The restriction of publicity concerning balances is significantly based on the prohibition to publish any data pertaining to defense production enterprises, and the relationship of these to the weakening of state security. At the same time, other countries, such as the U.S., do not perceive the existence of such relationships. Defense production enterprises too publish their balance sheets regularly. These published balance sheets do not provide unlimited insight, of course. On the other hand, companies which for some reason do not publicize their data, suffer a market disadvantage (e.g. they pay higher rates of interest on bonds).

The other part of the often complained about classified documents has to do with special data pertaining to business organizations, which for some reason are handled on a confidential basis. Although some reference is made to the contents of these documents in MAGYAR KOZLONY, details are made available even to authorized persons only on a "for eyes only" basis without taking possession of the documents. Many consider useless and impermissible the fact that the size of producer subsidies is known only to a few dozen people, instead of providing full publicity to such matters.

Secrets include the supporting documentation of legislative drafts and proposals. This type of secret classification also has its disadvantages. It can hinder preparation by representatives of interests, elected bodies, parliamentary representatives, etc. vis-a-vis the authorities that classified such materials as secrets. For example, classifying as a secret the recommendation concerning social security benefit increases hindered the National Association of Small Tradesmen [KIOSZ] to perform its

interest representation functions in an undisturbed manner. To counter the secrecy of these documents KIOSZ sought legal recourse through the Ministry of Interior.

This dilemma is also motivated by the fact that the system governing economic interest reconciliation has not been worked out. In more accurate terms, the issue is that those interested frequently make use of the lack of regulations. It does happen that organs having jurisdiction invite opposing interests to participate in decision-making only in the 24th hour or thereafter. Let us consider for example the decrees which regulate income or for that matter, village meetings. The delayed showing of cards can be used also as a tactical institutional weapon against partners in the bargaining process. A special group of matters to be treated on a confidential basis is comprised of all kinds of documents which pertain to firms registered, or which ceased to exist as a result of liquidation prior to 1 January 1950(!). These documents were restricted on the basis of Minister of Justice decree 6/1967 for a quarter of a century, and they pertain to businesses which have ceased to exist half a century ago. These documents include, among other matters the basic data of no longer existing corporations, the former bylaws, Court of Registry data, etc.

These black lists easily transcend, and obviously go beyond the necessary limits for the safeguarding of state and service secrets. This is even more so, because in this area of law the legally permissible limit is unknown. In other words: matters that cannot be classified ["transgressions"] are not defined ["sanctioned"] in criminal law. Thus, documents of interest to the public may be removed from the publicly available body of documents for decades, or even infinitely.

It is true, of course, that one may seek and receive personal exemptions from under the latter limitations. But the permit process is lengthy and bureaucratic. Permission to review the aforementioned corporate documents requires written petitions, quite frequently the concurrence of 3-4 institutions (Minister of Finance, Hungarian National Bank, the Court of Budapest, the National Archives), and if everything goes well a 2-3 weeks waiting period. On top, they usually impose the condition that the work to be prepared on the basis of reviewing the requested documents must be presented [to the authority which grants the permit] in advance.

Other nonpublic documents include topics, subjects and events which were centrally defined or were not revealed to the mass communication media. Regardless of which category we use as an example, we are usually confronted with an individual decision [to classify a certain document as secret] and not with a legally mandated classification. It can happen that matters of interest to the public become publicly unavailable ["are removed from the 'program'"] overnight. Taboo orders may come over the telephone on the basis of invoking the interest of the people's economy, or even without that.

Authorities responsible for given subject areas enjoy unlimited opportunity to decide when the curtain should be drawn over what kinds of cases. May I present a few random examples?

Data concerning major, national investments are not included in the budget, and may be found only in the complete financial balance sheet of the people's economy. People's Control is inclined to treat findings which could potentially discredit the personal allotments to supreme authorities as confidential, while similar data concerning enterprise personnel is subject to less reservation. The Hungarian Telegraph Agency's [MTI] "C Papers"—[clippings] from the international press—continue to be restricted for "internal use only." For the first time in 1988, the AISH [abbreviation unknown] did not make a secret of compensation paid to olympic contestants. On occasion we find some innocent matters like "novel theoretical issues of health care financing" shielded from the public.

In theory, the confidential sphere is in agreement concerning the scope of documents to be treated as confidential within the framework of the protection of traditional state and service secrets. In practice, however, the narrowing of public information is to be interpreted more broadly. An example for this is the matter of Hungarian capital outflow which in theory is classified as public information, and is officially not deemed a secret. Nevertheless, in reality matters like the returns on the Jamburg, Tengiz and Usti-Ilimsk establishments, foreign exchange balances, the exchange rates used, and the expected profits on these contracts remain obscure. These data, which are essentially of a public information nature, are, in reality, unavailable to persons outside of the most tightly knit group of persons in charge.

Similarly, the curtailment of economic openness cannot be justified always by state or service concerns. Otherwise, how could it be explained that the operating procedures, organizational rules and most important: the benefits granted in the framework of these for the Concord Hunting Association are classified as secret. There should be no misunderstanding: here and now the primary concern is not the matter of unauthorized privileges to which persons or lobbies are entitled. This matter pertains much more to the unveiling of information which, one could assume, could stun society. Today's tax payers' confidence levels are more sensitive than ever before. Especially, if these citizens learn that part of the public funds which are also derived from their hard earned income is used for purposes of which they were not told, or which perhaps are not supported, or even opposed by public opinion.

The present oversized confidential sphere evolves virtually on the basis of standard practice. One should rather be amazed about the opposite. Namely, and quite appropriately, violations of secrecy procedures are subject to

sanctions. On the other hand, there are no sanctions for superfluous secret classifications. Thus, the persons who classify cases are not harmed, perhaps they are praised for their actions.

Declaring taboos involves no risks. It involves additional administration, but in this regard costs are of no concern. It is very hard to prove that the expensive practice of protecting secrets is frequently illusory: it protects only some kind of a pseudo pregnancy, and covers only perceived or unreal values.

The label "for internal use only" is becoming increasingly popular in the administrative processes of authorities and offices. With it, the two step progression of secrecy is expanded by yet another step. Consensually agreed upon abstention from airing significant economic blunders, errors and mistakes continues to be strong—if such revelations would offend the general state of health of smaller or larger communities. To this date, the effects of the earlier hierarchical management style and of the large enterprise structure have not ceased to exist. These are: short circuits in informational and informal relationships, and keeping secret the advantages which may be obtained through these.

The battle lines of secretaucracy are still strong. Its resources are not ebbing away, on occasion they are even replenished. For this reason in these days it will not suffice to only review the decree with the force of law concerning state secrets and service secrets: the issue now has constitutional law implications. The time has come that beyond the justified protection of secrets, the public too receive some protection, and that such protection become a requirement.

#### How Long is a Secret a Secret?

Whenever I must officially travel abroad, I am always aggravated by an unusually senseless practice in the framework of the administration of secrecy. What am I talking about? About the fact that if I want to carry along some document, calculation, reference work, i.e. a handbook or the text of a law which is needed for the performance of my work, I must prepare a consignment list. Then the list must be rendered sacred by having affixed various seals. I have to prepare a double layer TUK [Secret Case Handling?] package, which, in turn must be once again blanketed with seals.

What happens thereafter? At the border station I hand over the original of the consignment list to the customs agent together with the TUK package. Using his mechanical reflex the customs agent tears off the outside cover of the package, takes out the copy of the consignment list which heretofore rested between the two covers. With that, secrecy has come to an end.

Let's analyze this a bit: for how long did secrecy exist? It is not hard to figure out, it lasted from my workplace to the border station. Accordingly, this entire procedure

took place to protect working documents against dangers while in transit. But a price is paid for all this in the form of time wasted and increasing nervousness.

The entire process makes no sense also because it is publicly known that documents which constitute state secrets may be carried, and taken across the border only by diplomatic couriers well trained to perform this function. These people enjoy special diplomatic protection throughout the world and know their business.

Why can't the Hungarian citizen who enjoys confidence in the possession of a worldwide passport enforce this; for what purpose should this senseless document handling practice be sustained?

### **Independence of Intra-Enterprise Ventures Suggested**

25000101b Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
19 Jan 89 p 5

[Article by Gabor Kleinheincz and Laszlo Neumann: "Inside Enterprise: the Perspective of Going Independent"]

[Text] One way of transforming overly centralized enterprise organizations would be the gradual separation of inside ventures from large enterprises. An example would be leasing small cooperatives which were formed out of units within enterprises. In one of the foundries of the United Electrical Machinery Works [EVIG] in the countryside, custom component parts molded by hand were manufactured for many years. No substantive development took place as long as the plant at Pusztahencse (Tolna County) belonged to the enterprise. Buildings were in a sad condition and the 19th-century technology was suited only for the production of simple, relatively small gray iron moldings. Even the molds were made by hand, some of the work was performed outdoors.

Production at the enterprise declined in 1988. There would have been a need for significant reduction in personnel (at least 15 persons), moreover the continued maintenance of the plant no longer made sense. But the skilled and unskilled workers at the plant would have experienced difficulty in finding work in the area. It was at this point that the idea of partial severance from the enterprise occurred: a small cooperative formed by the workers would lease the equipment from the enterprise. In this manner the needs of the enterprise would continue to be satisfied, and layoffs could be avoided because the small cooperative could take orders from the outside. Thus the enterprise benefitted, and the reduction in personnel was avoided on the basis of regulations pertaining to aggregate income.

The enterprise leased the equipment to the small cooperative on the basis of its inventory. Consumables will become the property of the small cooperative which by 1990 will not be paying a leasing fee. The enterprise will

be paid a fee after the rental of machinery and equipment, while the funds allocated for buildings may be withheld by the small cooperative for renewal and maintenance. Quite naturally, contributions made by members of the small cooperative and profits may be used for investment purposes. In response to orders received from the enterprise the small cooperative delivers at relatively low, fixed prices, which, compared to the prices charged by other outside vendors is clearly advantageous from the enterprise's standpoint. But the cooperative also benefits, because a significant part of its capacity is securely committed in the long term.

After three or four months the cooperative venture was able to enter the market of foundry goods. By the end of last year they had 6 million forints worth of open orders, of which only 30-40 percent constitutes orders from the enterprise.

An independent small cooperative on the marketplace is conceivable only if it has new products available. This is because component parts manufactured by using the molds prepared for the enterprise cannot be sold except to the enterprise. The small cooperative accepts production orders for small series as well as on short notice. The more obvious route to initiate a capital intensive venture would have been the acquisition of tools from customers, but under such circumstances the small cooperative would have surrendered its profits obtained from direct sales in the marketplace. In such case the danger of dependency would emerge. Thus by enlarging its product line, the small cooperative chose to manufacture goods in short supply.

On the other hand, new, modern products can be manufactured only with more up to date machinery. Accordingly, on a long term basis, technological development and new buildings must also be taken into consideration. Long range plans also call for a new production profile in which they want to employ the female workforce of the village.

Accordingly, in the course of a few months there would come about a successful venture with an independent market. But would the contractual provisions permit the realization of these long range plans?

The delivery contract between the enterprise and the small cooperative expires in six months, while the leasing agreement has a term of two and a half years. What may be expected when the terms of these contracts are subject to renegotiation? If the original contract is satisfactory to both parties the leasing agreement may be extended unchanged. But it can be seen already that the contract which treats for instance the assets, as recorded in the inventory, as an indivisible unit is disadvantageous to the small cooperative. It would be more advantageous if the small cooperative could get rid of the burden of useless means of production, and with that avoid the payment of fees related to these useless means of production. There may be a dispute also over prices, if

the enterprise is not willing to recognize existing price levels in the foundry market. In such instances the small cooperative experiences a condition of dependency. People in the area have difficulty in finding other work, moreover, they are also bound by investments. The large enterprise may abuse its economic superiority and may enforce some contractual provisions which benefit the large enterprise. It can threaten to terminate the contract. But this is true also in the reverse. The small cooperative which has gained strength in the meantime may abandon the plant, may transfer the assets into its own new plant. In such case, in the absence of personnel, the enterprise will have difficulty operating the foundry it regained.

Quite understandably, the small cooperative invests its own capital into movable machinery and tools, because the contracts are insecure in the long term. It expends moneys for the renewal and maintenance of buildings only from funds withheld from leasing fees earmarked for buildings. The small cooperative also gives serious consideration to whether new buildings should be erected on the lot owned by the enterprise.

The investment would hold less risk if the leasing contract would specify that after four or five years fixed assets become the property of the small cooperative. On the other hand, the enterprise views the reservation of part of its capital as security for the continued satisfaction of its needs.

Reaching an agreement involves expenses in any event. Nevertheless the scheme described above has a clear advantage insofar as a stable economic relationship can evolve between a large state owned enterprise and its supplier on a contractual basis, which takes into consideration the interests of both parties. Accordingly, the chief argument of those who oppose the independence of ventures inside the enterprises was proven incorrect. That argument holds that by surrendering direct supervision, an enterprise cannot ensure the satisfaction of its needs. Thus the superior right of parent companies can no longer be sustained.

## POLAND

### New Rules Mark 'Radical Reform' for Banking

#### Interest, Credit Issues

26000297 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
2 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[PAP Article: "Rules of the Banking Game"]

[Text] (PAP) As we already reported, with the new year, nine newly formed commercial banks began their operations. On 29 December 1988 the Polish National Bank issued an order governing the rules for collecting interest on loans and granting interest on money in bank accounts. Generally speaking, it defines the limits within which banks can function in their contacts with customers.

The central bank's basic rate of interest, as of 1 January 1989, is 44 percent. That is the interest that the Polish National Bank will collect on the refinancing loans granted other banks.

But the individual banks can set their interest rate on loans quite freely. The president of the bank defined the maximum of this interest at 66 percent. The exceptions are loans for preferential purposes (development of agriculture and the food economy, increasing the export capability, savings of fuels and energy, and environmental protection). Interest on loans granted for these purposes fluctuates from 22 to 33 percent, plus not more than nine points, which is the bank's profit margin.

However, the rules governing interest on loans for housing purposes have not yet been defined. The Council of Ministers will issue a separate order on this. But undoubtedly these loans will carry an even lower interest rate.

It was also decided that cash loans granted to individuals cannot carry an interest rate lower than 55 percent, with the exception of young married couples (14 percent) and disabled persons for the purchase of wheelchairs or specially equipped automobiles (9 percent). Also, individuals drawing a cash loan for economic activity in the preferential fields are entitled to the rates mentioned earlier in this connection.

Beginning with the new year, the interest rates on bank deposits have also changed. The minimum interest rate on 6-month deposits is 33 percent; 1-year deposits, 44 percent; 2-year deposits, 55 percent; and 3 years or longer, 66 percent. The interest on deposits payable on demand cannot be less than 11 percent. However, legal entities will not receive interest on deposits payable on demand.

Banks are required to inform their customers of the amount of the interest rate paid on bank accounts and the amount of interest rate charged on loans. It should be added that although the order went into effect on 1 January 1989, it applies also to loans granted prior to this date if the amount of the interest rate was not stated in the loan contract.

The Universal Savings Bank (PKO), the State Bank, has already made a decision governing interest rates on deposits and loans. Savers who put their money into term passbook savings accounts and other term-type deposits are entitled to 66 percent interest (annualized) on 3-year deposits, 55 percent on 2-year deposits, 44 percent on 1-year deposits, and 33 percent on 6-month deposits.

PKO will pay 12 percent (annualized) interest on personal deposits in payable-on-demand passbook savings accounts.

It should be added that the present interest rates can be changed and increased if the rate of price growth in 1989 differs from that which is now envisaged.

The interest rates on loans drawn from PKO have also been changed. They will be the same for the people in general, economic organizations, and individuals conducting economic activity. The top interest rate on PKO loans ranges from 66 percent for cash loans drawn for a period longer than 2 years, to 27 percent on loans drawn for preferential economic purposes.

Interest rates on past loans taken to finance housing construction in all of its forms remain unchanged. However, the interest rates on new loans taken for this purpose in 1989 will be fixed separately at a later date.

#### **New Banks 'Break' Monopoly**

26000297 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish  
6 Jan 89 p 5

[Article by B.P.: "Breaking Through the Bank Monopoly"]

[Text] It is really very hard at this time to keep up with the changes being made in the banking system. Most of the interest is being focused on the new interest rates on savings deposits and loans, overshadowing somewhat the matters connected with the internal reform of the banking system. Yet its effects and significance in the revitalization of the economy are difficult to overestimate.

Setting up, as of 1 January, nine new state savings and loan banks, separate from the structure of the Polish National Bank, is a serious and even crucial step on the road to deep reconstruction of the banking system—basing it on commercial principles and on various forms of ownership.

The new banking concept is a definite departure from the sector-branch arrangement in favor of a universal arrangement, in two respects.

First, each of the newly formed banks is able to conduct the broadest possible activities, beginning with loan and foreign-exchange services, managing of organizational units from all economic sectors, down to services for the public as a whole. But despite the striving towards universalism of services, it is not inconceivable that with time some banks will specialize in selected fields of activity.

Second, the universalism of the new system is expressed in its organization, which is based on an extensive network of different banks functioning in every region of the country, for it is important that the customer be really able to choose his banking partner. But in order to

avoid too many changes simultaneously, as a rule it was decided that this ability to choose will go into effect in the second half of this year. In justified cases, e.g., when a new bank branch is opened near the enterprise, exceptions to the above rule are made.

The principle is that more than one bank or branch of the state bank must operate in every voivodship, regardless of the presently existing network of PKO branches and cooperative banks. The larger the voivodship, obviously the larger the selection of a bank. For example, in Katowice Voivodship, in addition to the Bank of Silesia, there are six branches of other state banks. In Warsaw Voivodship, in addition to nine branches of the local State Loan Bank, five branches of state banks whose headquarters are in other voivodships were set up.

In addition, at present 14 initiatives are being registered which are aimed at establishing new banks in the form of joint stock companies. The initiators are simply waiting for a new bank law to be passed which will greatly simplify the procedure of creating new banking institutions. We might also mention other future—although not really all that distant—prospects which involve plans to establish municipal banks. Every large voivodship wants to establish a municipal bank just as soon as the problem of municipal ownership is settled by law.

The present radical reform of the banking system, just as every deep economic process, provides many opportunities. But it is also very difficult.

The new banking system being created for good economic organizations creates opportunities for economic expansion. It brings with it the prospect that the tradition of saving and confidence in the zloty will be restored. For example, when the Bank of Silesia, challenging PKO and taking advantage of the new ability to fix the interest rate on deposits, offered its customers a higher interest rate on 2-year deposits than PKO did, the telephones at the National Polish Bank Main Office rang continuously. Huge numbers of customers asked for the addresses of Bank of Silesia branches.

There will undoubtedly be more such proposals. And soon they will no longer shock us, for basing the operation of banks on commercial principles means that the best banks will win out—those which are most efficient and can offer better service to their customers.

#### **YUGOSLAVIA**

##### **Federation Budget for 1989 Analyzed**

28000058a Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA  
in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 88 p 12

[Article by V. Grlickov: "Resistant Rights"]

[Text] Next year as well, if the federal government's proposal is passed, the federation budget will not be subject to restrictions like other public spending. It will

be increased by 169 percent (it would amount to 20,920 billion dinars), while other public spending would grow by 115 percent. In examining the budget, the data on federation spending are not alarming: it would have a 6.1 percent share of the estimated social product (339,503 billion dinars). Nonbudget consumption this year, however, is higher than the "real" budget. If everything remains as it has been, which is considered a realistic supposition, the two budgets will "absorb" over 12 percent of the social product. The calculation does not include the "third" budget, exchange rate differences at the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBY], which is estimated at 13,730 billion dinars.

On the basis of legal rights in the budget, it is necessary to ensure a real growth of consumption (higher than inflation, which is estimated to be 133 percent). The legal right of the army (4.92 percent of the national income) specified by the plan ensures it the largest part (15,240 billion dinars, or 71.6 percent) of the federation budget. The army is not renouncing its rights, pointing out that it needs the funds for investments (more than half of the designated amount) in the modernization of the armed forces; it even insists that its "withheld" entitlement this year be compensated for in 1989, in view of obligations to arms producers for work already begun. There is a similar situation with the second largest, after the army, beneficiary of the budget (over 2,800 billion dinars): the recipients of veterans' disability and military pensions are demanding their rights, and these are benefits along the lines of various supplements for merit, free use of various high-quality facilities, and the assurance of incomes (for military retirees) at the level of those who are in active service... The federal government asserts that here, as well, nothing can be done to revise the rights, because they, among other things, are under the jurisdiction of the republics and provinces. At first it seemed that the rights of the underdeveloped areas, the third largest beneficiary of the budget (over 1,300 billion) would be revised, and that the growth of the budget funds for this purpose would be reduced to an acceptable 115 percent for "stabilization" reasons. It turned out, however, that these were only accounting acrobatics, and that the funds for the underdeveloped areas were balanced against their obligation to contribute to the federal budget. That is the reason for the criticisms that the demand for additional funds on the part of the underdeveloped areas constituted a demand for an expansion of their existing legal entitlement (0.53 percent of the social product).

It is a significant innovation that the federal government is not planning that the budgetary revenues will be ensured by a further increase in the tax rate, nor does it plan an inflationary expansion of the tax base (naturally, above the estimated 133 percent inflation). The assertion seems illogical, because it is not possible to ensure a real growth of the budget without increasing the rate of taxes or customs duties or introducing new taxes. The federal government is in fact aiming at a new solution, using a newly "acquired" constitutional right, and has proposed

keeping the entire amount of the turnover tax for itself, without leaving any part of it for the republics and provinces. Thus, 11,826 billion dinars would be ensured for the budget. On the other hand, contributions from the republics and provinces are also taken into account (3,807 billion dinars). In fact, these, along with tariffs and duties (5,000 billion) are the most significant sources of budgetary revenues (there are also 68 billion from taxes, 162 billion from agency revenues, and 130 billion from other revenues).

The volume of the nonbudgetary balance, which is maintained under the name of the federation's intervention in the economy (this primarily involves export incentives) is half the size of the "real" budget, while it is being stressed that not one special purpose from this year has been dropped from the financing program (it is only in Serbia that there is no special-purpose expenditure, but the funds for the federation's contribution to JUBMES [Yugoslav Bank for International Economic Cooperation] are a new item). From everything that could be heard in the assembly finance committee, however, it is clear that this does not represent the federation's total nonbudgetary balance. Many intervention items are not included in the account (progressive rates in agriculture, differential interest rates, the coverage of exchange rate differences for importing oil, and perhaps even some exchange rate differences at the NBY), and many of them will probably come into play later. The conclusion is that the total nonbudgetary balance is not closed, if we may use assembly terminology. The sources from which the funds would be provided cannot be seen and for the time being are not being proposed. For the time being, sources amounting to about 13,500 billion are envisioned (various exemptions from the payment of taxes and duties, and import taxes), which is not enough for a nonbudgetary balance which is expected to be at least at the level of the "real" budget.

In the initial assembly discussions the Federal Chamber, which determines the volume of expenditures and where decisions are made by majority vote, accepts the draft budget for the next year, while criticisms in principle are made by the Chamber of the Republics and Provinces. It is necessary to revise the rights of beneficiaries, so that the growth of the federal budget would be coordinated with trends in total public spending. Furthermore, the army ought to consent to a revision of its entitlements and make a contribution to stabilization, if not through the "vital" part of investment consumption and consumption for current expenses, then at least in the items where it ensures a high standard. The biggest problem, however, occurs in the "nonsystemic" area. In the real budget, the republics and provinces do not agree to the federation's taking away part of the basic turnover tax, while at the same time leaving them obligations to contribute to the federal budget. What is being proposed (that the republics and provinces ensure contributions to the budget at the expense of opstina revenues) does not appear to be feasible, because that will not be resolved through uniform republic turnover taxes. The alternative

is for the funds to be obtained by issuing federal bonds (the savings of the population) with incentive interest rates, but that is also not considered feasible for the time being. On the other hand, the republics and provinces

are trying to retain their rights to the funds due to them from the nonbudgetary balance, while trying to "shove in" new special purposes, such as providing working capital for the economy in underdeveloped areas.

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